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PAGE, STEPHEN L., Ed.D. The Emerging "Standard of Reasonableness" 
for Search and Seizure in American Public Schools: Pre- and Post-New 
Jersey v. T.L.O. (1987) 
Directed by Joseph E. Bryson. 158 pp. 
Search and seizure involving public school children is a relatively 
recent issue in American public education. Prior to 1985 search 
situations were litigated in virtually every level of state and federal court 
except the United States Supreme Court. In December 1985, the Supreme 
Court decided New Jersey v. T.L.O. The crux of this decision was the 
annunciation of "reasonable suspicion" as the standard to which school 
officials would be held. The Court established an inquiry process to assist 
in determining the legality of a search, but did not define 
"reasonableness." 
Based on analysis of research presented in this study, it is apparent 
the definition of "reasonableness" is elusive. Determination of 
reasonableness remains a process imbued with human judgment. 
Nevertheless, certain conclusions can be drawn from the research: (1) 
public school searches and resulting litigation will continued; (2) in loco 
parentis will no longer serve as a sanctuary for school officials seeking to 
justify search of a public school student or his property; (3) immunity from 
civil prosecution will be difficult to obtain for school officials conducting 
unjustified and illegal searches; (4) the courts will continue to be 
concerned about students' rights and will not permit unrestrained search 
by school officials; (5) "reasonable suspicion" supported by articulable 
facts will be the standard applied to school personnel-not probable cause; 
(6) defining "reasonable suspicion" will continue to be a problem involving 
the judicial conceptualization of factors surrounding school related 
searches; (7) reasonableness will be based on factors influenced by a legal 
framework involving articulable facts and a reasonable scope of search 
based on those facts; (8) other issues related to reasonable suspicion and 
search and seizure will continue to emerge in future litigation; and (9) the 
courts will continue to show a strong support for school officials, 
especially when a relationship can be shown between the area searched 
and the objected being searched for. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
On January 15, 1985, the Supreme Court in New Jersey v. T.L.O..1 
addressed for the first time the issue of search and seizure in the public 
schools. Paramount to the case was a much litigated issue concerning the 
application of the Fourth Amendment as protection for students against 
searches conducted on school grounds by school officials. The Court 
affirmed what had already emerged in numerous lower court decisions 
that a standard of "reasonable suspicion" should supplant the rigid 
standard of "probable cause" set forth under the Fourth Amendment. 
Although the Court spelled out certain guidelines to assist in determining 
what would be reasonable, it stopped short of producing a full blown 
definition. How reasonable suspicion or "reasonableness" should be 
applied will be an outgrowth of subsequent cases that have recently been 
litigated or are currently before the courts. 
An analysis of judicial decisions concerning search and seizure 
indicates an overwhelming absence of cases prior to the early 1970's. 
Many authors suggest that the cause for so little attention, prior to the 
decade, was because earlier searches and seizures were often affairs that 
remained internal to school and rarely involved outside authorities. They 
also down played the seriousness of items being searched for and relegated 
1New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985). 
2 
them to be far less important to the harmony and well-being of school than 
items being sought for today. The transformation, therefore, proceeded 
from slingshots, pocketknives and . . the fruits of minor thievery" to 
more serious items, especially guns and drugs.2 
The earliest search and seizure cases occurred in Tennessee in 1930 
and 1944.3 The scarcity of litigation for the following quarter century is 
attributed to the courts' failure to apply the Fourth Amendment to public 
schools. School personnel were not considered governmental persons, but 
rather private citizens, not held to the Fourth Amendment's prohibitions.4 
Searches during this period were certainly not uncommon. It was a 
standard procedure in many public schools to periodically search student 
lockers and confiscate disallowed items. Serious items such as stolen 
property and alcoholic beverages often resulted in referral to juvenile 
authorities or suspension.5 Two factors, both occurring in the late 1960's, 
would change this simple and little challenged process. The first factor 
was the sudden and dramatic introduction of illegal drugs on the public 
* 
— 
Kern Alexander and David M. Alexander, The Law of Schools. 
Students and Teachers (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1984), p. 131. 
^Phillips v. Johnson, 12 Tenn. App. 354 (1930) and Marlar v. Bill, 181 
Tenn. 100,178 S. W. 2d 634 (1944). 
^Robert E. Phay, "The Law of Procedure in Student Suspension and 
Expulsions," NOLPE Monograph Series, (September 1977), p. 36. 
^Thomas J. Flygare, The Legal Rights of Students (Bloomington, 
Indiana: Phi Delta Kappa Educational Foundation, 1975), p. 17. 
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school campus.6 The problem was recognized early to be a conflict between 
the "searches and seizures" provision of the Fourth Amendment and the 
responsibility of school officials to suppress the possession and use of 
harmful drugs in the schools.7 This process must be considered in light of 
a second factor. Beginning in 1967 with the celebrated due process case of 
Gault8 and continuing in 1969 with Tinker.9 national attention was focused 
on the constitutional rights of children. This attention was further 
stimulated in 1975 by Goss and Strickland.10 
It was therefore the juxtaposition of a number of features including 
drugs, guns and students' rights activism that fostered and sustained a 
deluge of search and seizure cases. The definition and establishment of 
student rights under these circumstances might be viewed as a "sign of 
the times." But what was also emerging in the courts was an absence of 
any specific set of standards. On a case to case basis, words phrases and 
ideas were applied in different manners. The most significant was the 
6William D. Valente, Law in the Schools (Columbus: Merrill 
Publishing Company, 1986), p. 324. 
?H. C. Hudgins, Jr., Legal Issues in Education, ed. E. C. Bolmeier. 
(Charlottesville, Virginia: The Michie Company, 1970), p. 108. 
8ln re Gault, 387 U. S. 1 (1967). 
^Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U. 
S. 503 (1969). 
l^Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565 (1975) and Wood v. Strickland, 420 U. S. 
308, 95 S. Ct. 992. 
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application of the word "reasonable."11 Other important ideas were also 
brought under judicial review. At issue was whether or not school officials 
were agents of the state. Could school officials operate under the protection 
of in loco parentis while conducting searches? A review of early judicial 
decisions indicates a varied interpretation with issues and standards 
oscillating from one jurisdiction to another. T.L.O. settled this issue. The 
court held that the concept of in loco parentis was ". . .in tension with 
contemporary reality and the teachings of this Court." School officials are 
therefore the very same representatives of the state as pronounced in 
Tinker and Goss.12 
Thus the standard of "reasonableness" will be the major focus of this 
study. The standard of reasonableness as applied prior to T.L.O.. how it 
was defined and applied in T.L.O.. and how the standard has been applied 
in judicial decisions since T.L.O. will be explored. Recommendations will 
be made to practicing school officials concerning the application of a 
rational standard of reasonableness. 
STATEMENT OF PROBLEM 
Practicing school administrators are burdened daily with a 
diversified operation that encompasses virtually the entire range of 
^ Diane C. Donoghoe, "Emerging First and Fourth Amendment 
Rights of the Students," Journal of Law and Education 1, No. 3 (July 1972), 
p. 465. 
l^New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985).' 
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business management, human relations, and educational decision­
making and with applying laws to the overall process. Police and other 
state agents, empowered with the right to make arrests, are involved in 
searches and seizures on a frequent basis and are informed about 
limitations concerning rights of people whom they serve. School officials, 
on the contrary, may not be confronted with search and seizure issues 
except on an infrequent basis and thus are unsure of their obligations and 
rights of students to whom they are charged to protect. The potential for 
error can work two ways. First, there can be the danger that the student's 
constitutional rights are violated and that a search is not justified and 
possibly illegal. The student is thus harmed and the school official is in 
jeopardy of being sued. Second, the uninformed school official may extend 
an unjustified and too liberal protection to an individual and thus put the 
larger group—the school and its student body—in a position of being 
endangered by an individual who is harboring dangerous contraband. It 
is therefore imperative that a school official understand the rights of the 
student as well as their own administrative obligations in conducting 
searches of students' persons and their private property on school 
grounds. 
QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED 
The major purpose of this study is to examine the evolution of 
reasonableness pre and post-T.L.O. and to produce a workable 
6 
recommendation for the use of school officials who must conduct a search 
in a public school setting. 
Below are listed several key questions which need to be answered so 
that guidelines can be developed: 
1. How was the "standard of reasonableness" concept addressed 
in judicial decisions? 
2. How did the Supreme Court address the "standard of 
reasonableness" in T.L.O.? 
3. Did the Supreme Court's case of T.L.O. decision confirm 
previous judicial decisions by lower courts? 
4. Did T.L.O. redefine and establish new constitutional 
procedures? 
5. How have lower courts addressed the "standard of 
reasonableness" concept since the Supreme Court's T.L.O. decision? 
6. Based on an analysis of judicial decisions since T.L.O.. what 
are the emerging trends and issues concerning search and seizure? 
METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION OF ISSUES 
This is an historical study of legal issues concerning the emerging 
"standard of reasonableness" for search and seizure of students in 
American public schools. Thus the methodology is both historical and 
descriptive. An indepth review and search was made of the Education 
Index and cross referenced with the Cumulative Index to Journals in 
Education. Computer assisted searches were then initiated using a 
7 
combination of word descriptors from the Thesaurus of the Educational 
Resources Information Center (ERIC). An investigation was also made 
using the Cumulative Book Index, the Reader's Guide to Periodical 
Literature, the Index to Legal Periodicals, and the Legal Resource Index. 
A search was made of existing studies in the field using Dissertation 
Abstracts. 
General references and a broad overview of issues can be found in 
the Encyclopedia of Educational Research, the Encyclopedia of Crime and 
Justice, and in fastbacks published by Phi Delta Kappa. Particularly 
helpful was Phi Delta Kappa's Legal Research for Educators (1984). Also 
useful was the National Organization on Legal Problems of Education's 
(NOLPE) Cases on . . . series which listed case citations on given topics. 
Search and seizure was updated in 1986. The American Civil Liberties 
Union also published in 1977 The Rights of Students as part of their 
"Rights of. . ." series. NOLPE also publishes a School Law Reporter that 
reviews all current cases. 
Legal research was assisted by use of the massive National Reporter 
System. The American Digest System. Corpus Juris Secundum, and 
American Jurisprudence. A Uniform System of Citations was useful in 
sorting through legal citations and putting them into a homogeneous 
pattern. Black's Law Dictionary was especially helpful for identifying 
terms and for producing definitions of legal phraseology. A valuable 
secondary source was the American Law Reports (ALR). The ALR is a 
combination of case reporter and journal and is useful in giving insight 
into legal issues 
8 
DEFINITION OF TERMS 
The terms defined herein are related to issues of search and seizure 
and occur and reoccur numerous times in the literature. The primary 
source of these definitions has been Black's Law Dictionary. Overall, this 
has been the most reliable source and the one most compatible with 
definitions brought forth in the case law. 
Consent search: A search that is made after the subject of the 
search has consented freely and willingly. No warrant is necessary and it 
has been accepted that the fruits of such a search are legal and proper.13 
Exclusionary rule: This rule simply provides that evidence seized in 
an illegal search cannot be admissible in legal proceedings against the 
defendant. This is restricted to criminal proceedings of the court but has 
not been applied to administrative proceedings such as those rendered by 
the public schools in disciplinary matters. It has been the attempt to 
exclude evidence seized in school searches from being admitted into 
criminal proceedings that has generated a significant number of search 
and seizure cases.14 
Exigence or Exigency: This term is used to describe compelling 
circumstances that together or separately may require immediate action 
k 
1 3 
Henry Campbell Black, Black's Law Dictionary. 5th Ed. (St. Paul: 
West Publishing Co., 1979), p. 277. 
14Ibid., p. 506. 
9 
or remedy. The courts have applied this term to many search and seizure 
cases to test for critical conditions or pressing necessity to search.15 
In loco parentis: The single factor most cited by experts as the 
reason for practically no litigation on search and seizure prior to the 
1970's. It is literally interpreted as "In place of a parent." It bestowed 
upon school personnel the same rights and protections while dealing with 
children that the natural parents of the children enjoyed.16 
Plain view doctrine: Items of contraband which are plainly open for 
view are sufficient grounds to conduct a warrantless search. So too have 
school officials enjoyed the same principle while dealing with illegal items 
on school grounds.17 
Probable cause: This is the standard called for by the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. For the purpose of search 
and seizure, it is the standard to which all law enforcement officers are 
held. It is the standard that goes beyond mere suspicion and belief and is 
supported by facts and evidence that a reasonably intelligent and prudent 
man would be compelled to believe that a search was justified.18 
Reasonable suspicion: Although Black does not apply reasonable 
suspicion to search and seizure as was done with the term probable cause, 
nevertheless a comparable definition is used. Reasonable suspicion still 
15Ibid., p. 514. 
16Ibid., p. 708. 
17Ibid.,p. 1036. 
18Ibid., p. 1081. 
10 
requires that an "ordinarily prudent and cautious man" would be 
compelled to believe an incident had occurred or that contraband was 
present. Reasonable suspicion is a lesser standard than probable cause 
and does not require a warrant before conducting a search.19 
DESIGN OF THE STUDY 
This study is divided into five major chapters. Chapter II will be a 
Review of Literature on Search and Seizure and will cover the historical 
significance of this issue. Chapter III will be focused upon the issue of a 
"standard of reasonableness" and the development of the standard as a 
philosophical basis for conducting searches in public schools. The issues 
will be reviewed as pre-T.L.O.. T.L.O.. and post-T.L.O. Chapter IV will be 
an analysis and review of major litigation on search and seizure since 
T.L.O. Efforts will be made to show the trends of current litigation as 
influenced by the Supreme Court's T.L.O. decision. And finally, Chapter 
V will provide a summary, conclusion, and recommendations for 
practicing school officials. The questions asked in the introduction chapter 
will be answered here. 
19Ibid., p. 1138. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
The search and seizure issue in American public schools has been a 
problem of relatively recent vintage. Yet, despite the newness of the issue to 
public education, it is certainly not new to the American thought process. 
The legal questions revolving around search and seizure are a direct 
outgrowth of the application of the Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. The Fourth Amendment development can be traced back to 
British Common Law and to the development of early legal rights claimed 
by sixteenth century lawyers. For example, Sir Edward Coke (1552-1634) 
stated that "... a man's house is his castle, et domus sua cuique 
tutissimum refusrium" and "The house of every one is to him as his castle 
and fortress, as well for his defence against injury and violence as for his 
repose."1 There are thus developed centuries earlier, a rich British 
Common Law tradition where every man's home was his castle upon 
which the drafters of the Constitution were greatly influenced.2 At this 
time an interesting paradox was unfolding in the American experience. In 
iJohn Bartlett, Familiar Quotations (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Company, 1938), p. 21. 
2Lester S. Jason et al., eds., The Constitution of the United States of 
America. Analysis and Interpretation (Washington: U. S. Government 
Printing Office, 1973), p. 1041. 
12 
Britain, William Pitt, Earl of Chatham (1708-1778) was secretary of state 
and prime minister.3 In a speech to Parliament on the Excise Bill, Pitt 
eloquently exhorted that: 
The poorest man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the force of the 
Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind maj' blow 
through it; the storms may enter, the rain may enter-but the King of 
England cannot enter; all his forces dare not cross the threshold of 
the ruined tenement.4 
During this same period, and on the eve of the American Revolution, 
a much celebrated case unfolded in England, Entick v. Carrinsrton.5 
Agents of the King had conducted widespread searches for materials 
related to John Wilkes polemical pamphlets. These documents had been 
less than complimentary of the King and had attacked numerous 
government policies. Suit was brought by Entick, Wilkes friend, because 
his house had been searched and virtually all personal papers, charts and 
pamphlets had been seized. The British court ruled in favor of Entick citing 
that the search conducted by the state agents had been "... contrary to the 
genius of the law of England." Furthermore there had been no 
demonstration of probable cause, nor had there been a record made of what 
had been seized.6 
^Samuel Eliot Morison, The Oxford History of the American People 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 165. 
4Bartlett, p. 230. 
519 Howell's State Trials 1029, 95 Eng. 807 (1765). 
6Jason, p. 1042. 
13 
While Pitt was standing before Parliament eloquently arguing for 
sanctity of an Englishman's home and while an English court heard 
arguments for private citizen Entick, the issue of search and seizure was 
very much alive in the American colonies. The paradox was that William 
Pitt was the government official most responsible for the experience 
Americans had with search and seizure. Prime Minister Pitt ordered that 
the Molasses Act of 1733 be strictly enforced by British agents in the 
colonies. The enforcement was to be accomplished by the detested writs of 
assistance.7 
The writ of assistance was a Crown issued document that gave 
colonial customs officials an almost unrestricted privilege to search homes 
and businesses suspected of concealing contraband.8 The search was 
focused upon molasses being imported from Caribbean islands controlled 
by Spain and France. Products from these foreign islands were subjected to 
the hated tax. Since colonists had a strong dependence on the molasses for 
the operation of their rum distilleries, the law was flagrantly ignored. It 
was therefore an unpopular law that served as a catalyst to a still more 
unpopular executive order.9 
Widespread discontent was the American reaction to writs of 
assistance. The writs served to further broaden the already widening gap 
7Morison, p. 183. 
8Bernard Schwartz, The Bill of Rights: A Documentary History. 
(New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1971), pp. 205-206 and Fundamental 
Freedoms Project: Search and Seizure Source Book (Columbus, Ohio: 
Xerox Education Publication, 1973), p. 6. 
9Morison, p. 183. 
14 
that was developing between Britain and the colonies. James Otis, a 
prominent Boston attorney, challenged the writs in court. In the courtroom 
was John Adams, who recorded Otis' heated argument. Prior to the trial, 
Otis had served the Crown as advocate general, but relinquished the 
position to argue for the colonies. Although Otis was eventually upheld on 
the local issue he argued, the discontent spawned during this period would 
resurface again.10 In June 1767, Parliament passed the Townshend Act in 
reaction to certain American pamphleteers who had argued against direct 
internal taxes such as those provided for in the Stamp Act. Parliament 
hoped that an indirect tax such as that provided by import duties would be 
less offensive to the colonists. To collect duties on paper, glass, paint and 
East India Company's tea, an American Board of Commissioners of 
Customs was established. Writs of assistance were again used to search 
for contraband that escaped the scrutiny of newly commissioned customs 
officials. Americans were thus further reinforced in their bitter attitude 
toward unrestricted search of homes and businesses.11 The use of search 
and seizure and the perceived abuse that occurred was one of the most 
deeply felt grievances held by the Americans against the British 
government.12 
10Graebner, Norman A. et al., A History of the American People 
(New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1970), pp. 116-117 and Morison, 
p. 183. 
1:LWilliam Cohen and John Kaplan, Bill of Rights. Constitutional Law 
for Undergraduates (Mineola, New York: The Foundation Press, Inc., 
1976), p. 516 and Morison, p. 192. 
12Encvclopedia of Crime and Justice, ed. Sanford H. Kadish, (New 
York: The Free Press, 1983), p. 1416. 
15 
Although neither search and seizure nor writs of assistance were 
mentioned in the American Declaration of Independence, reference was 
made of the King's refusal to . . assent to laws the most wholesome and 
necessary for the public good."13 Americans, did not forget the lessons 
learned under British colonial rule. Before the newly drafted Constitution's 
ratification in 1789, a number of states insisted that a statement of human 
rights be included. Thus the Bill of Rights was drafted and included along 
with the Constitution for ratification. The Bill of Eights became the first ten 
amendments to the Constitution. The Fourth Amendment specifically 
addressed search and seizure.14 The Fourth Amendment was thus drafted 
by the framers, for specific practical reasons. The intention was to provide 
enforceable safeguards against abusive high-handed search and seizure 
measures experienced by the American colonists. What is abundantly 
clear is that the amendment was not an outgrowth of abstract philosophical 
thought or political theory.15 
The federal judiciary was created by the Constitution. It consists of a 
Supreme Court and a series of lower federal courts. These courts are 
charged with the responsibility to interpret the Constitution and to rule on 
laws passed by Congress. The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution is 
13The Declaration of Independence (1776). 
14Paul Lewis Todd and Merle Curti, Rise of the American Nation 
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1966), pp. 161-189. This 
popular high school textbook from the 1960's is explicit in its development of 
the idea that a person is secure in his person and property against 
unwarranted searches and seizures. It is the opinion of this writer that 
public school children of the 1960's and 1970's were cognizant of these ideas. 
15Cohen, p. 513. 
16 
part of the supreme law of the land and is subject to interpretation by the 
federal courts. It is this interpretation and review in relation to American 
public education that is the subject of this study. And it would be 
inappropriate to explore the development of litigation concerning search 
and seizure in the schools without first understanding its development to 
the public at large. 
While it may be true that students were searched while attending 
school in colonial times, any resulting litigation would have been settled in 
the colonial courts controlled by the English crown. No such cases have 
been discovered in researching the period. From 1789 to present times, 
there have been discernible periods which mark the evolution of the 
American courts relative to education. The first period has been described 
as one of "strict judicial laissez faire." This period from 1789 to about 1850 
is distinguished by an absence of court activity on educational issues. 
Federal courts viewed public education as a state and local matter. Even 
state courts rarely intervened in school matters during this period.16 
A second period began during the mid 1800's and lasted for the next 
century. State courts asserted that education was a state and local matter. 
Relatively few cases were presented to the Supreme Court concerning 
education. The body of case law concerning education grew at the state 
level. Many issues which, in fact, would have been contrary to the 
protections of the Constitution, were allowed to flourish in the states. The 
third period began in 1950. Referred to as the "reformation stage," this 
16John C. Hogan. The Schools, the Courts, and the Public Interest 
(Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1974), p. 5. 
17 
period finds the federal courts, as well as the Supreme Court, recognizing 
that many state sanctioned educational policies and practices were actually 
out of conformity with constitutional guarantees. During this period the 
Court has sought to establish constitutional minimums to the state 
educational structures.17 
Concomitant with the reformation stage has been an increasing 
tendency of the courts to expand its powers over the American public 
schools. This period entitled, "education under the supervision of the 
courts," continues today. The courts have become directly involved in 
matters of administration, programs, organization and student rights. In 
many cases the courts have retained jurisdiction until the mandates of the 
court have been accomplished.18 
As public education continued to reach more students in the early 
twentieth century, the probability for challenges to school rules and 
regulations increased proportionally with the schools' population. The first 
significant litigation concerning student rights came in a 1923 Arkansas 
case, Puerslev v. Sellmever.19 A local school rule prohibited the wearing of 
transparent hosiery, low-necked dresses and cosmetics. Miss Pugsley 
chose to wear talcum powder on her face in direct defiance to the rule. The 
Supreme Court of Arkansas held that the school rule was reasonable and 
within the rights and powers of the board of education to make and enforce. 
17Ibid., pp. 5-6. 
18Ibid., p. 6. 
19Pugsley v. Sellmeyer, 158 Ark. 247, 250 S. W. 583 (1923). 
18 
The justices clearly stated that the responsibility lay with the local, 
organization and not the courts. 
. . . [C]ourts will not interfere in matters of detail and government of 
schools, unless the officers refuse to perform a clear, plain duty, or 
unless they unreasonably and arbitrarily exercise the discretionary 
authority conferred upon them.20 
Newton Edwards in his 1940 classic, The Courts and the Public 
Schools, confirmed this principle established by Pugslev. The courts 
universally have applied the test of "reasonableness" to school rules and 
regulations and have not interfered with board of education policies. Citing 
a number of cases that upheld the schools' rules and regulations, Edwards 
added this admonition: 
A board regulation is not reasonable or unreasonable per se: its 
reasonableness is determined by the circumstances of each 
particular case. A rule which is reasonable in a warm climate may 
be unreasonable in a cold climate; a rule may be reasonable when 
applied to a boy of sixteen but unreasonable when applied to a girl of 
six.21 
The courts, Newton contended, were reluctant to declare any board 
policy unreasonable. Judging on the wisdom or expedience of board of 
education rules and regulations would not be the responsibility of the 
courts, but left to the discretion of the local authorities.22 
John C. Hogan wrote about the natural outcome of this type of 
extended court behavior. While courts were consistently "leaving education 
2UIbid., p. 583. 
21Newton Edwards, The Courts and the Public Schools (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1940), p. 526. 
22Ibid., p. 526. 
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to the educators," state case law continued to increase in a volume that 
permitted practices that failed to meet minimum standard of constitutional 
guarantees. It was to be a mere matter of time that the attention of the 
federal courts would be activated to rule on legal issues related to public 
education. The change that would occur was an outgrowth of federal 
courts obtaining jurisdiction in education related cases. Prior to the 1950's, 
courts were being called upon to adjudicate the validity of state statutes 
under the United States Constitution. After 1950, cases involving the 
constitutional rights of individuals took the forefront. This was largely a 
result of the Supreme Court's interpretation that made the Bill of Rights 
applicable to the states.23 
And so it has evolved that education cases are not decided in isolation 
from other cases. In fact, it has been the adjudication of cases from a broad 
spectrum of issues from all walks of life that have influenced judicial 
decisions in cases related to education.24 Although not related specifically 
to education, these particular cases have created the framework from 
which the portrait of student search and seizure cases has emerged. Most 
of these precedent setting cases preceded the major student rights cases of 
the 1960's and 1970's. These also acted as major catalysts for the judicial 
focus on search and seizure in the public schools. 
^Hogan, p. 8. 
24E. Edmund Rcutter, Jr., The Supreme Court's Impact on Public 
Education (Topeka, Kansas: National Organization on Legal Problems of 
Education, 1982), p. 1. 
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The first major case heard before the Supreme Court on search and 
seizure was decided in 1886. This case, Bovd v. United States.25 established 
that an individual's privacy was protected by the Fourth Amendment. 
Although Boyd was not physically searched, he was compelled by federal 
authorities to produce documents that were self^incriminating. Justice 
Joseph P. Bradley wrote for the majority and explained that to compel a 
private individual to produce his own private papers, in order that criminal 
charges could be established against him, was within the scope of 
protections afforded by the Constitution and contrary to the Fourth 
Amendment.26 
Almost three decades later the Court accepted for review a case 
where an individual was subjected to warrantless arrest and seizure of 
letters and documents to be used as evidence against him. The defendant 
contended that the evidence was seized illegally and therefore should be 
excluded from consideration in the trial against him. Justice William R. 
Day explained in the Court's decision that no sanctions would be given to 
law enforcement officers who conduct unlawful seizures in order to gain 
evidence for criminal proceedings.27 
If letter and private documents can thus be seized and held and used 
in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of 
the 4th Amendment, declaring his right to be secure against such 
25Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, (1886). 
26Ibid., p. 630. 
27Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914). 
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searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed 
are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. . . ,28 
This case established that federal officials could not use illegally 
seized evidence in federal trials. The Weeks Doctrine did not apply to state 
courts or to actions by state officials.29 Over the next four decades a handful 
of related cases served to clarify the exclusionary rule established by 
Weeks.30 The next significant case occurred in 1947. In Wolf v. Colorado.31 
the Court extended the established federal protections of the Fourth 
Amendment to individuals involved in state criminal proceedings, but 
declined to extend the exclusionary rule to include state officials. Justice 
Felix Frankfurter writing for the majority put the use of "logically relevant 
evidence" above implied individual rights.32 
2«Ibid., p. 393. 
29Kern Alexander and M. David Alexander, American Public School 
Law (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1985), p. 352. 
30In Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385 (1921) the 
Court established that all illegally seized evidence was to be excluded in 
federal court. In Walder v. United States, 347 U. S. 62 (1954) and Stenfanelli 
v. Minard, 342 U. S. 117 (1951) the Court allowed the use of illegally seized 
evidence to determine the credibility of witnesses. In Goldstein v. United 
States, 316 U. S. 114 (1942) the Court found that only the person whose rights 
had been violated by an illegal search and seizure could benefit from the 
exclusion of the evidence. 
31 Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25 (1949). See Glendon A. Shubert, 
Quantitative Analysis of Judicial Behavior (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1959), 
pp. 341-361 for an analysis of cases between Weeks and Wolf. 
32Ibid., pp. 28-33. 
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We hold therefore, that in a prosecution in a State court for a State 
crime the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid the admission of 
evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure.33 
And so for nearly fifty years, the courts applied a dual standard to 
search and seizure cases. Federal courts and officials were held to a strict 
standard and state courts and officials to a lesser standard. The lesser 
standard came to be known as the "silver platter" doctrine because evidence 
illegally seized by state officials could be admitted in federal courts if it 
could be established that there had been no collaboration with federal 
officials.34 This would come to an end in 1961 in Mapp v. Ohio ,35 Cleveland 
police illegally entered a private residence and seized pornographic 
liteTature which led to the conviction of the owner. On appeal to the 
Supreme Court, the conviction was overturned and Wolf was reversed 
insofar as the application of the exclusionary rule.36 
Justices Felix Frankfurter, John Marshall Harlan and Charles E. 
Whittaker dissented. Justice Tom C. Clark wrote for the majority: 
The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State [by allowing 
use of illegally obtained evidence] tends to destroy the entire system of 
constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. 
Having once recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the 
Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States, and that the 
right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by state officials 
33_ 
34The Supreme Court and Individual Rights, ed. Elder Witt, 
(Washington: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1980), p. 179. 
35Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643 (1961). 
36Ibid. 
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is, therefore, constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that 
right to remain an empty promise.*7 
A knowledge of the issue surrounding the exclusionary rule is 
essential to an understanding of search and seizure in the public school. A 
significant number of school cases have involved pupil's attempts to have 
evidence seized by school officials ruled inadmissible by the courts. 
Another issue related to the exclusionary rule was settled in Gouled 
v. United States.38 The Supreme Court ruled that the protections of the 
Fourth Amendment were related only to the "fruits and instruments of 
crime and contraband" and not to "mere evidence." Aware that they 
personally could not conduct a legal search for contraband or evidence, 
federal authorities conspired with a friend of Felix Gouled to seize evidence 
from Gouled for them. Letters were seized, turned over to the federal 
authorities and introduced in court. Gouled was convicted of defrauding 
the government. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction and further 
extended the protections of the Fourth Amendment.39 The significance of 
this can be seen in instances where police have sought to have school 
officials conduct searches. 
The same year the Court further clarified protections of the Fourth 
Amendment in Burdeau v. McDowell.40 McDowell, who had been 
37Ibid., pp. 659-660. 
38Gouled v. United States, 255 U. S. 298 (1921). 
39Ibid. 
40Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U. S. 465 (1921). 
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dismissed from his employment, was convicted in federal court on evidence 
presented to authorities by his former employers. The evidence was seized 
after a lock was blasted from McDowell's private office safe. The Court 
ruled that the Fourth Amendment protects citizens only against searches 
and seizures conducted by government agents. The protection is not 
extended to include searches and seizures by "private individuals."41 The 
significance of this case surfaced time and again in public school cases as 
litigants sought relief from searches conducted by school officials. The 
question was simply, were school officials agents of the state subject to the 
restrictions of the Fourth Amendment or did they act as private 
individuals, exempt from such exemptions? And as in Gouled. were they 
acting in behalf of government agents? 
Another issue concerned warrantless searches where the person 
being searched waived the expectation of a search warrant and gave 
consent. The judgment in the most significant case was handed down in 
1973. Justice Potter Stewart wrote for the majority and concluded that a 
person who voluntarily consents to a search, without threat ". . . and not 
the result of duress or coercion, expressed or implied" gives up his 
protections afforded to him by the Fourth Amendment.42 A strong dissent 
was noted from Justices Thurgood Marshall, William J. Brennan, Jr., and 
William O. Douglas who questioned the logic of the majority. How could a 
person rationally give up a protection "... as precious as a constitutional 
41 Ibid. 
42Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U. S. 218, 248-249 (1973). 
25 
guarantee without ever being aware of its existence."43 The significance of 
this litigation to searches and seizures in an educational environment is 
obvious. Subsequent cases emerging from search and seizures in the 
public school environment have leaned upon this consent doctrine. 
Another significant development concerned the searching of 
automobiles. In Carroll v. United States44 the Court established a venerable 
precedent that allows law enforcement officers to conduct warrantless 
searches of automobiles. Chief Justice William Howard Taft wrote for the 
Court. Unlike a stationery building or dwelling a ". . . vehicle can be 
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant might 
be sought." It is therefore impractical to expect law officials to procure a 
warrant to search something that might be moved in the interim.45 The 
principles established in Carroll was refined over the next half century and 
the substance of this principle remained intact. The significance to 
educational cases increased in proportion to the increasing number of 
students who brought automobiles to school. 
Probably no issue better demonstrates the labyrinth of problems and 
intricacies facing the courts than that of administrative searches. This 
type of search includes a broad range of governmental responsibilities to 
inspect for health, fire, and safety hazards in homes and businesses. 
Tangential cases related to arson investigation, and the regulation of guns 
43Ibid., p. 277. 
44Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132 (1925). 
45Ibid., p. 153. 
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and alcohol have further expanded the issue. In Frank v. Maryland.46 
health officials were excluded from restrictions under the Fourth 
Amendment. This decision was reversed in 1967 in Camara v. Municipal 
Court.47 The Court stated: 
It is surely anomalous to say that the individual and his private 
property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the 
individual is suspected of criminal behavior.48 
The application of this principle would be renewed in cases involving 
the search of student lockers for library books, forgotten lunches and, of 
course, contraband. 
Eavesdropping cases have also been categorized as Fourth 
Amendment related. The landmark case, Olmstead v. United States.49 
involved the telephone wiretap of an alleged bootlegger. The Supreme Court 
reasoned that the Fourth Amendment protected only against "material" 
searches. Since there was no search of a person or a "thing," it reasoned 
that no violation had occurred. A dissent written by Holmes chided his 
colleagues for their decision and expressed his opinion that it was "... less 
evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should 
play an ignoble part. . ." in such an invasion of privacy.50 As the Court 
46Frank v. Maryland, 359 U. S. 360 (1959). 
47Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U. S. 523 (1967). 
48Ibid., p. 530. 
4901mstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438 (1928). 
50Ibid., p. 466. Justice Louis D. Brandeis also dissented and 
expressed vehemently his opinion that wiretapping was clearly a search as 
defined by the Fourth Amendment, and a crime in itself. 
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sought to further define its opinion concerning the use of electronic 
eavesdropping, the opinion of the minority eventually emerged as the 
opinion of the majority. Olmstead was reversed in 1967 by Katz v. United 
States.51 Justice Potter Steward writing for the new majority expressed that 
the Fourth Amendment protected people, not places. What a person seeks 
to keep private is protected by the Constitution. In the case of Katz, his use 
of a telephone booth was private, not from visual inspection, because he 
clearly was visible to anyone who chose to look, but rather to his spoken 
word which he sought to keep private by closing the door.52 The intricacies 
of electronic eavesdropping continues to unfold and will undoubtedly be the 
subject of future litigation. The application for public school cases emerged 
with the use of one-way mirrors, metal detectors and dogs trained to smell 
for drugs.53 
The dramatic emergence of search and seizure cases in the late 
1960's would not have occurred without the development of case law just 
discussed. But case law alone could not have been sufficient catalyst to 
cause this emergence. Another major factor was the change that 
transpired in the composition of the Court in the early 1950's. No single 
factor is more significant than the appointment by President Dwight D. 
Eisenhower of Earl Warren as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. 
51 Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 247 (1967). 
52Ibid. 
530ther case law has accumulated relative to search and seizure 
which seemingly has little direct application to public school cases. These 
include, but are not necessarily limited to, cases of border searches and 
other cases related to national security. 
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Eisenhower announced that his choice was based on Warren's integrity, 
middle-of-the-road philosophy and on experience in law and government.54 
Within months of his appointment, Warren wrote the Court's 
unanimous landmark decision in Brown v. Board of Education.55 This 
monumental decision exemplifies the onset of the reformation stage of 
court development. Warren's conversion from moderate to liberal was not 
instantly apparent. During the same year that Warren wrote Brown, he 
voted in Irving v. California56 to uphold a criminal conviction based oh 
evidence that was illegally seized by California authorities. His 
conservatism was short lived and by 1956 it was generally recognized that 
Warren had shifted from a moderate-center position and was aligning 
himself with the more libertarian members of the court.57 
Bernard Schwartz portraited Warren as the man who served the 
country for sixteen years from 1953 to 1969, establishing what would forever 
be known as the "Warren Court." 
It was a period in which the Supreme Court furiously generated 
precedent after legal precedent that would touch more American 
lives, then and later, more directly than any other institution or 
series of events in the twentieth century save the Great Depression.58 
54Catherine A. Barnes, Men of the Supreme Court: Profiles of the 
Justices (New York: Facts on File, Inc., 1978), p. 154. 
55Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U. S. 483 (1954). 
56Irving v. California, 347 U. S. 128 (1954). 
57Barnes, p. 155. 
58Bernard Schwartz and Stephan Lesher, Inside the Warren Court 
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1983), p. 3. 
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The Warren Court oversaw "... the greatest American social and 
political revolutions since the War Between the States." White patrimony 
ultimately yielded to black power. National paranoia shifted from its focus 
on communism and McCarthy to crime. There was rampant civil disorder 
brought on by social conditions and an unpopular foreign war. Civil 
liberties were expanded along with academic and political freedom, the 
franchise, the right to assemble and religion. The Court limited the power 
of". . . politicians in smoke-filled rooms . . . and defined the limits of police 
power."59 
The Court, which in the past had served as "... a brake on the social 
mechanism," now pushed out in front of public opinion and led the way for 
new standards of societal control and behavior. Never in American history 
had the general public become so conscious of the changing role of the 
Supreme Court.60 School personnel were especially aware of the changes 
taking place. As one public school principal noted in 1968: 
. . . [W]e have entered a new era of individual rights and the chances 
are  grea t  tha t  the  secondary  school  wi l l  be  increas ingly  af fec ted  . . . .  
the new bounds established for freedom of speech, religion, and 
press; the revolution in pretrial criminal procedure; the revamping 
of juvenile court processes to accord the young accused rights 
formerly reserved for adults; the ferment cf the college campus—all 
will most certainly have influence on high schools.61 
59Ibid., pp. 3-4. An excellent treatment of the Warren Court relative 
to public education can be found in Hudgins, H. C., Jr., The Warren Court 
and the Public Schools (Danville, Illinois: The Interstate Printers and 
Publishers, Inc., 1970). 
60Paul L. Murphy, The Constitution in Crisis Times (New York: 
Harper and Row, Publishers, 1972), p. 458. 
61W. E. Griffiths, "Student Constitutional Rights: The Role of the 
Principal," N.A.S.S.P. Bulletin 50 (September, 1968), p. 30. 
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Education had achieved a high priority among the developing social 
needs of the time. With the high interest in all phases of education, came 
increased interest in legal aspects. George Johnson referred to this 
phenomenon as "creeping legalism in education."62 Although the Court 
had dealt with pre-college public school disciplinary rules in the past, it had 
limited its involvement to issues involving religion. In February 1969, the 
Court issued a landmark decision that would turn "creeping legalism" into 
full gallop. Tinker v. Pes Moines Independent Community School District63 
established guidelines for student rights.64 The case involved the 
suspension of students for wearing black armbands as a symbolic protest 
for the war in Vietnam. School officials had banned the wearing of 
armbands because of fears that it would create a disturbance at the 
school.65 The specific facts of the case have had little impact on public 
education, but what the court had to say about student rights had an 
"alarm bell in the night" effect on public education. Tinker undoubtedly 
has become the most referred to case on student rights.66 The classic 
statement of Tinker expressed by the Court is as follows: 
62George M. Johnson, Education Law (East Lansing: Michigan State 
University Press, 1969), p. xix. 
63Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U. S. 503, 89 S. Ct. 733 
(1969). 
64Reutter, p. 145. 
65Tinker, p. 736. 
66Reutter, p. 145. 
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First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special 
characteristics of the school environment, are available to teachers 
and students. It can hardly be argued that either students or 
teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or 
expression at the schoolhouse gate.67 
Although the issues involved in Tinker were not directly related to 
the Fourth Amendment, the resulting references to student rights had 
direct applicability to cases involving student searches and seizures.68 
Another case of the period also had a profound effect on student rights 
issues. In re Gault69 involved a juvenile who had been denied the right to 
confront or cross examine witnesses in a criminal proceeding against him. 
Although this case was not specifically related to public education, the 
findings would have a direct influence on educators' treatment of juveniles. 
Gault established that juveniles were not to be treated differently from 
adults on issues of "due process," of notice of charges, of the right to have 
counsel, and from self-incrimination.70 Although search and seizure cases 
increased significantly after 1969, the Court continued to define students' 
due process rights. In Goss v. Lopez.71 the Court specifically extended "due 
process" requirements to the public schools. School officials in Ohio had 
67Tinker, p. 736. 
68It is interesting to note that Tinker represents a complete reversal 
of the burden of proof as required in Pugsley. The reasonableness of a 
school rule was shifted to the school personnel, who would be responsible 
for demonstrating the necessity of a school rule. 
69In re Gault, 387 U. S. 1 (1967). 
70Ibid. 
71Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565 (1975). 
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argued that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applied 
only to issues where there was a deprivation of life, liberty, or property. 
Since none of these elements were present in the case against Goss, the 
educators reasoned that Goss could not seek its protection. The Court in a 
five-to-four decision, found that students did have a "property" interest in a 
state-granted public education. Furthermore, the recording of suspensions 
on student records, reasoned the Court, also established a liberty interest 
for students.72 
The literature on search and seizure would not be complete without a 
commentary on the social conditions of the times. The period directly 
preceding the onset of search and seizure litigation was marked by student 
unres t  and  dissa t i s fac t ion .  As  Diane  Donoghoe wrote ,  these  were  " . . .  
signs of our times."73 Students were becoming increasingly angry with the 
"establishment" and a feeling was growing that the social structure as well 
as "oppressive" authority had to be changed.74 Alfred Kelly compared the 
United States in 1970 to the United States after the War between the States. 
There was, he wrote, a prevailing atmosphere of crisis. America was 
deeply enthralled in an era of political, economic, and social change. Kelly 
enumerated the various pressures on the United States. These included the 
emergence of the United States as a world "superpower," and the resulting 
internal stresses brought on by the Cold War. To this was added stress 
721bld: 
73Diane C. Donoghoe, "Emerging First and Fourth Amendment 
Rights of the Students," Journal of Law and Education 1 (July, 1972), p. 465. 
74Ibid. 
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caused by repeated social crisis, internal problems, Vietnam, the black 
revolution, populist egalitarianism, youth demanding a greater role in 
societies' decision-making processes, pollution, overpopulation and the 
New Left.75 
It is not surprising then that students began to question their rights 
in all aspects of their existence in school. Prior to 1969, there were only two 
search and seizure cases litigated. Both cases occurred in Tennessee and 
are isolated in the literature on search and seizure. The first case involved 
a teacher's search of a student because the student had been physically 
present in a room where money was later discovered missing. The teacher 
sought protection under the principle of in loco parentis. The court said 
that in loco parentis was extended to school personnel for their 
performance as teachers, but not for the purpose of recovering money from 
a student for a third party.76 The second case involved a teacher's search of 
a student's pockets after it was discovered that money was missing from a 
room where he had been found. The court ruled that the teacher was 
acting in the best interest of the student because the search was conducted 
merely to clear the student from suspicion.77 
Although a notable void developed in search and seizure cases for the 
next quarter-century, the evidence is conclusive that public school searches 
75Alfred H. Kelly and Winfred A. Harbison, The American 
Constitution. Its Origins and Development (New York: W. W. Norton and 
Company, 1970), p. 1062. 
76Phillips v. Johns, 12 Tenn. App. 354 (1930). 
77Marlar v. Bill, 181 Tenn. 100,178 S. W. 2d 634 (1944). 
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continued. John C. Walden pointed out the uniqueness of school searches 
during what he labeled as the "formative years" of public education. When 
a search did occur, it focused on a minor school rule or a petty theft and the 
worst result was an outburst by angry parents.78 Thomas J. Flygare 
recalled his teaching experience during the same period. 
When I was a teacher . . . the principal would ring the school bell, 
and all students were instructed to file into the hallway and stand by 
their lockers .... Each locker was then thoroughly searched. Any 
suspicious items such as squirt guns, girlie magazines, cigarettes, 
etc., were confiscated.79 
Prior to 1969, the right of school personnel to conduct searches of 
students and their property was seldom questioned. The prohibitions of the 
Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches was generally accepted 
to be inapplicable to public school situations.80 This attitude was to change 
quickly and dramatically. A primary factor in the equation, and one that 
would bring attention to public schools from all quarters was illegal 
drugs.81 The use of illicit drugs dramatically increased the incidents of 
school searches and students armed with the newly acquired knowledge of 
their "rights" were quick to challenge the use of warrantless searches by 
78John C. Walden, "Searches in the Schools: Implications of Recent 
Court Decision," National Elementary Principal 52 (September 1972), p. 97. 
79Thomas J. Flygare, The Legal Rights of Students (Bloomington: 
The Phi Delta Kappa Educational Foundation, 1975), p. 17. 
80Leroy J. Peterson and Lee O. Garber, The Yearbook of School Law 
1972 (Topeka: National Organization on Legal Problems of Education, 
1972), p. 185. 
81Martha M. McCarthy and Nelda H. Cambron, Public School Law. 
Teachers' and Students' Rights (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1981), p. 
301. 
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school officials.82 Scholars of school law were equally quick to recognize the 
potential for legal complications brought on by the responsibilities of school 
officials to suppress the possession and use of harmful drugs by public 
school students.83 Data collected over this period by the U. S. Department of 
Health, Education, and Welfare confirmed the increase of drug use among 
high school students. Sixty-five percent of high school seniors in the United 
States admitted to using illicit drugs at least once in their lives. Ninety 
percent reported that marijuana was readily available on their school's 
campus.84 In 1968 the New York Times reported that marijuana use 
among incoming college freshmen was on the increase. Most of the 
students were already using the drug by the time they arrived on the college 
campus.85 
saWilliam D. Valente, Law in the Schools (Columbus: Merrill 
Publishing Company, 1986), p. 324. 
83H. C. Hudgins, Jr., Legal Issues in Education, ed. E. C. Bolmeier 
(Charlottesville: The Michie Company, 1970), p. 108. 
84Drugs and the Nation's High School Students (Bethesda: U. S. 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Publication No. 80-930, 
1979), p. 23. 
85New York Times. January 11,1968, p. 18, col. 2. 
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The literature related specifically to public school search and seizure 
begins with the first modern search and seizure cases in 1969.86 Writing in 
the 1970 Yearbook of School Law. Lee O. Garber made this observation: 
As would be expected, cases are beginning to arrive in appellate 
courts involving public school students and the Fourth Amendment's 
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. Since 
possession of certain narcotics constitutes a criminal offense, as well 
as a problem of school discipline, it is in this connection that the 
problem is most frequently arising.87 
Three major cases were heard in 1969 alone.88 These cases in turn 
generated significant scholarly analysis. The vast majority of commentary 
has made its appearance in scholarly journals and as parts or chapters of 
books on educational law and student rights. Several writers have been 
prolific while a majority have produced singular articles. The 
preponderance of literature is relatively narrow in scope and is generally 
repetitious. Because case law provides a continually unfolding saga, the 
resulting literature has tended to be cumulative and emphasizes cases 
most current to the time of the article's publications. 
Three cases prior to 1969 were related to searches conducted on 
university campuses. The first established that school officials could enter 
a dormitory room with a warrant if an emergency existed. People v. Kelly, 
16 Cal. Rptr. 177 (1961). The second case established the necessity for 
college officials and police to acquire a warrant before conducting a search 
of a dormitory room. People v. Cohen, 292 N.Y.S. 2d 706 (1968). The third 
rejects the concept of in loco parentis for college officials. Moore v. Student 
Affairs Comm., Troy State Univ., 284 F. Supp. 725 (1968). 
87Lee O. Garber and E. Edmund Reutter, Jr., The Yearbook of School 
Law. 1970 (Danville, Illinois: The Interstate Printers and Publishers, Inc., 
1970), p. 335. 
88In re Donaldson, 269 Cal. App. 2d 509; 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1969), State 
v. Stein, 456 P. 2d 1 (1969), and People v. Overton, 301 N.Y.S. 2d 479 (1969). 
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Much of the literature expands on issues relative to cases before the 
court at the time of the article's publication. Consider the discrepancies in 
these article titles: "Search of Lockers with Drug-Sniffing Dogs Does not 
Violate Students Constitutional Rights" and in contrast "When It Comes to 
School Drug Searches, Take this Prudent Advice: Beware of the Dog."89 
Although personal opinion emerges in many of the articles, the majority 
are narrative in nature and serve as reports on the courts' opinions, an 
interpretation and a statement of its implications. 
SUMMARY 
A review of pertinent literature on search and seizure in the public 
schools has shown that the issue of search and seizure is richly entwined 
in British Common Law and the American colonial experience. Although 
public school cases did not emerge until midway into the twentieth century, 
precedents were being established throughout the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century as courts sought to apply and interpret the Fourth 
Amendment to the Constitution. 
The emergence was also tied into the dramatic change in American 
jurisprudence brought on by the Warren Court. The Warren Court was 
unequaled in its pursuit to establishing equality and protection to all 
citizens under the Constitution. Concomitant to the actions of the court 
S9Phyliss Huffman, "Search of Lockers with Drug-Sniffing Dogs Does 
not Violate Students Constitutional Rights," School Law Bulletin 12 (April, 
1981), pp. 17-18 and Benjamin Sendor, "When It Comes to School Drug 
Searches, Take the Prudent Advice: Beware of the Dog," American School 
Board Journal 170 (March, 1983), p. 23. 
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were dramatic economic, political and social stresses being brought onto 
American society. All of this provided fertile ground for the resulting 
deluge of search and seizure cases that would commence in 1969. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE EMERGING "STANDARD OF REASONABLENESS" 
FOR SEARCH AND SEIZURE IN AMERICAN PUBLIC SCHOOLS 
INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court's decision to grant certiorari in the 1985 New 
Jersey v. T.L.O.1 search and seizure case involving an assistant principal's 
search of a fourteen-year-old high school freshman girl produced a 
landmark decision concerning the application of the Fourth Amendment to 
searches conducted on school grounds by school personnel. Inherent in the 
review is the Court's collective wisdom on right of students to be secure in 
their person and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures 
balanced against the public school's responsibility to maintain an 
atmosphere conducive to learning and for safety for both students and 
teachers. 
The volume of prior litigation by the U. S. Court of Appeals, U. S. 
District Courts and State Appellate Courts is extensive. The Court in 
deciding T.L.O.2 relied on a multiplicity of ideas and issues that had 
emerged from these cases. Of paramount concern was the standard of 
reasonableness that would justify the physical search of a public school 
!New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985). 
2Ibid. 
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student. Initially the lower courts relied exclusively on established 
criminal case law, but as school related cases began to accrue, courts began 
to rely on other school decisions and the collective arguments and rationale 
for various findings began to enmesh. 
Cases prior to T.L.O. could not benefit from Supreme Court decisions 
based on school related search and seizure. Thus courts were relatively 
free to develop their own arguments and rationale based on specific facts of 
the case. The Fourth Amendment protects individuals against 
"unreasonable" searches and seizures. The standard established by the 
constitutional framers called for warrants to be issued "... only upon 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation . . . ."3 It is therefore 
inferred that a "reasonable" search is permitted, and the Court determined 
that the search of T.L.O. was reasonable. The determination of 
reasonableness, the Court said involved a ". . . twofold inquiry as to whether 
the action was justified at its inception and whether the search as actually 
conducted was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which 
justified the interference in the first place."4 
Cases subsequent to T.L.O. relied on this twofold inquiry process. 
The Supreme Court either from its own wisdom, or perhaps its own 
uncertainty, stopped short of producing an all encompassing formula for 
determining reasonableness. As cases continue to mount in number, the 
3U. S. Const, amend. IV. 
4New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 734 (1985). 
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definition of reasonableness and what constitutes a reasonable search in 
the public school setting will emerge. 
THE EVOLUTION OF REASONABLENESS--PRE-T.L.O. 
The judiciary's concept of reasonableness applicable to educational 
related issues is not unique to search and seizure. A standard of 
reasonableness prevailed in the majority of educational related litigation 
until Tinker5 in 1969. 
From Pugslev (1923) until Tinker (1969), in school cases, the courts 
almost uniformly adopted the concept of "reasonableness" as the 
standard for measuring the constitutionality of an educational 
practice or a school rule. They refused to consider if such practice 
was wise or expedient, but asked only whether it was a reasonable 
exercise of the power and discretion of the school authorities. Where 
a school rule could not be shown by the plaintiff to be "arbitrary, 
capricious, or unreasonable," the courts would not interfere, leaving 
the matter to the educational judgment and discretion of the school 
authorities . . . .6 
There is, of course, a certain frustration in dealing with a nebulous 
conceptual term such as reasonableness. Reasonableness by its very 
nature is closely tied to and dependent upon specific circumstances of each 
case. As stated in Chapter Two: "A rule which is reasonable in a warm 
climate may be unreasonable in a cold climate; a rule may be reasonable 
when applied to a boy of sixteen but unreasonable when applied to a girl of 
5Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 89 S. Ct. 733. 
6John C. Hogan, The Schools, the Courts, and the Public Interest 
(Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1974), p. 80. 
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six."7 As cases involving search and seizure developed after 1969, courts 
found themselves involved in developing doctrines, phrases and ideologies 
on a case-to-case basis. 
[T]he deluge of litigation concerning the enumeration, definition, 
and extent of particular rights possessed by students, and the degree 
of control permitted the schools in regulating these rights has not 
brought forth a specific set of standards that can be followed by 
students and school officials alike. Each case applies a doctrine, 
phrase, or ideology on a case-to-case basis, using a different 
interpretation of these words and phrases to meet the specific 
situation. The best example of this is in the courts' use of the word, 
"reasonable." It is almost impossible to get a clear definition of this 
word from the cases. If the court feels a school or university rule or 
regulation is valid, it is "reasonable", and the actions taken by the 
school principal or university official will be upheld. It bases this on 
the need of the public school official to act under the in loco parentis 
doctrine or on the holding that the action was a "reasonable" attempt 
to maintain order and discipline in order to carry out the educational 
functions of the school.8 
Each case coming before the courts required the inspection of facts 
and circumstances that ranged along a continuum of probability from "no 
evidence" to "almost certainty." Application to students of probable cause 
and reasonableness became a direct outgrowth of the courts' 
interpretations of the facts of each case. But the problem continued to 
remain one of interpretation.9 
The degree of reasonableness required to justify one particular form 
of intrusion is not constant; specific guidelines are difficult to 
ascertain. Some courts, for example, rely on the intrusion at a 
7Newton Edwards. The Courts and the Public Schools (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1940), p. 526. 
8Diane C. Donoghoe, "Emerging First and Fourth Amendment 
Rights of the Students," Journal of Law and Education. 1, No. 3 (July 1972), 
pp. 465-466. 
9Ibid., p. 449. 
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particular moment, as perceived from the then-known facts, and 
weigh this against society's interest^]10 
In the 1968 Terry v. Ohio.11 case, "society's interest" was the 
prevailing issue. Here, a balance was made by the Court to determine if a 
search conducted by a reasonably prudent man (in this case a police officer) 
" . . .  would  be  warranted  in  the  bel ie f  tha t  h is  safe ty  or  tha t  of  o thers  was  in  
danger."12 Terry involved a type of police procedure known as "stop and 
frisk." The intent was to make sure potential criminals were not armed 
upon making contact with an investigating police officer. The Court ruled 
that for reasons of practicality, the police officer was exempt from obtaining 
a warrant to search but was not exempt from the "reasonableness" 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment.13 
In order to assess the reasonableness of conduct as a general 
proposition, it is necessary first to focus upon the governmental 
interest which allegedly justifies official intrusion upon the 
constitutionally protected interests of the private citizen for there is 
no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing 
the need to search against the invasion which the search entails.14 
The police officer in Terry had "... to point to specific and articulable 
facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, 
reasonably warrant the intrusion."15 Mere "hunch" would not be 
luIbid. 
^Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
^Ibid., p. 27. 
13Ibid. 
14Ibid., pp. 20-21. 
15Ibid., p. 21. 
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sufficient.16 It was precisely an adaptation of the Terry standard that many 
courts applied in school related searches.17 
LOCKER SEARCHES 
Some of the first cases to reach the courts involved the search of 
students' lockers. In State v. Stein18 the principal's search of a student's 
locker was deemed to be reasonable despite the fact that the principal had 
been prompted by the police to conduct the search. Reasonableness was 
based on the administrator's claim that he had used his "own judgment" to 
make the search. The United States Supreme Court apparently agreed 
with the Kansas appellate court because certiorari was denied.19 
In another locker case,20 the Court of Appeal of California found that 
the warrantless search of a student's locker for drugs was deemed 
reasonable. The vice-principal had conducted the search predicated on 
information supplied by an informant who had purchased drugs from the 
defendant. Although no correlation was shown between the locker and the 
sale of drugs, the court stated that: 
16Ibid., p. 27. 
17Ann L. Majestic, "Search and Seizure in the Schools: Defining 
Reasonableness," School Law Bulletin. 16, No. 3 (Summer, 1985), p. 2. 
18State v. Stein, 456 P. 2d 1 (1969), cert, denied. 90 U.S. 966 (1970). 
19Michael La Morte et al.. Students' Legal Rights and 
Responsibilities (Cincinnati: The W. H. Anderson Co., 1971), p. 153. 
20In re Donaldson, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (Ct. App. 1969). 
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We find the vice principal of the high school not to be a governmental 
official within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment so as to bring 
into play its prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. 
Such school official is one of the school authorities with an obligation 
to maintain discipline in the interest of a proper and orderly school 
operation, and the primary purpose of the school official's search 
was not to obtain convictions, but to secure evidence of student 
misconduct. That evidence of crime is uncovered and prosecution 
results therefrom should not of itself make the search and seizure 
unreasonable.21 
In still another locker search case, Overton v. Rieger22 the court 
found the search conducted by a vice-principal to be valid and reasonable. 
The search was instigated by the police who produced a search warrant 
that was later found to be invalid. The discovery of drugs and the 
subsequent introduction of them into evidence against the defendant was 
nevertheless permitted because the search had been conducted not by the 
police but by the school official.23 The court furthermore was in agreement 
with the vice-principal's testimony "... that whenever in the course of his 
duties he received a report of the likelihood of the existence of an item of 
illegal nature in a locker assigned a student, he would undertake to inspect 
it."2* 
21 Ibid., p. 223. 
22Overton v. Rieger, 311 F. Supp. 1035 (1970), cert, denied. 401 U.S. 
1003 (1971). 
23Ibid., p. 1036. 
24Ibid., p. 1038. 
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A two-prong test for reasonableness was expressed in In re W.25 The 
search in this case was motivated by information supplied to the school's 
assistant principal by four informants. The court stated that: 
We believe that the appropriate test for searches by high school 
officials is two-pronged. The first requirement is that the search be 
within the scope of the school's duties. The second requirement is 
that the action taken, the search, be reasonable under the facts and 
circumstances of the case.26 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in the 1981 Zamora v. Pomerov27 
case, found that the use of dogs trained to sniff for drugs was not in 
violation of students' constitutional rights. A student's locker was 
searched after the dog alerted. The student was not arrested but rather was 
subjected only to school disciplinary action. The court found the school's 
action to be reasonable. Reasonableness was based on two key factors. 
First, the school maintained control and access to all school lockers. 
Second, the plaintiff, Zamora, had been furnished with a written policy of 
the school's dual control of lockers and notification that lockers were 
subject to search at any time. The validity of the search was based on 
reasonable suspicion.28 
^In re W., 29 Cal. App. 3d 777,105 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1973). 
26Ibid., p. 778. 
27Zamora v. Pomeroy, 639 F. 2d 662 (1981). 
28Phyliss Huffman, "Search of Lockers with Drug-Sniffing Dogs Does 
not Violate Students' Constitutional Rights," School Law Bulletin. 12, No. 2 
(April 1981), p. 18. 
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PERSONAL SEARCH (WEAPONS) 
In the 1978 In re Ronald B.29 personal search of a student reported to 
be armed was upheld by the Supreme Court, Appellate Division of New 
York. The court cited and enumerated several factors that when 
collectively answered would establish the reasonableness of a warrantless 
search. The factors taken directly from the 1977 McKinnon30 decision 
included the student's age, history and school record, seriousness and 
prevalence of the problem which prompted the search and factors 
contributing to the exigency to make the search without delay. 
Previous contact with a student led the court in In re L. L.31 to find 
that a teacher-conducted search was reasonable. Since the student had on 
previous occasions been in possession of razor blades and a knife, the court 
weighed factors outlined in In re Ronald B.32 and concluded that previous 
contact was sufficient to permit a reasonable search. On appeal the court 
concluded that subsequent discovery of marijuana and not a weapon did not 
affect the reasonableness of the case.33 
^In re Ronald B., 401 N.Y.S. 2d 544 (App. Div. 1978). 
30State v. McKinnon, 558 P. 2d 781 (Wash. 1977). 
31In re L. L., 90 Wis. 2d 585, 280 N.W. 2d 343 (1979). 
32In re Ronald B., 401 N.Y.S. 2d 544 (App. Div. 1978). 
33In re L. L., 280 N.W. 2d 343, 352 (1979). 
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PERSONAL SEARCH (STOLEN PROPERTY) 
Searches for stolen property have been viewed more stringently by the 
courts. Two exceptions include D.R.C. v. Alaska34 and In re Guillermo 
M.35 The search for stolen money in D.R.C. was reasonable because school 
officials were not actual police officers and therefore held to a lesser 
standard than probable cause.36 Likewise in the 1982 Guillermo M. 
decision, the court found that a pat-down by a school employed security 
guard was not subject to the strict constraints of the Fourth Amendment.37 
In Potts v. Wright38 a student reported to her principal that her ring 
was missing. The principal conducted a search of the room where the ring 
was last seen. Police were summoned when the ring was not located. 
Students known to have been in the class where the ring was missing were 
subjected to a strip search. The court in this case found that the highest 
standard of "probable cause" required by the Fourth Amendment was 
necessary. When the search becomes a severe invasion of privacy, there 
must be strong reasons to justify it. Merely searching for a ring certainly 
S4D.R.C. v. Alaska, 646 P. 2d 252 (1982). 
35In re Guillermo M., 181 Cal. Rptr. 856 (1982). 
36D.R.C. V. Alaska, 646 P. 2d 252, 254 (1982). 
37In re Guillermo M., 181 Cal. Rptr. 856, 859 (1982). 
SSPotts v. Wright, 357 F. Supp. 215 (E.D. Po. 1973). 
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cannot be deemed reasonable.39 And furthermore, the cooperation of school 
officials in a search conducted by police, could result in personal liability for 
those involved.40 
Using his judgment that a coat worn by a student was similar to one 
reported stolen, a school security guard ordered a student to empty his 
pockets. Revealed was an envelope of marijuana. The court held that the 
guard was subject to the full standard required by the Fourth Amendment 
and "... notwithstanding his professed experience in observing student 
habits in the packaging of marijuana . . . could not have known what he 
would find in the envelope."41 In Maryland a court also found that merely 
"hanging around" a gym locker where a theft of a watch and ten dollars 
was later reported, did not constitute sufficient reasonableness to justify a 
search. The recovered watch was later ruled as inadmissible as evidence 
under the exclusionary rule.42 
Two other cases concerning the search for stolen property also 
involved strip search. In Belliner v. Lund43 school officials were held to the 
39Anne M. Dellinger, North Carolina School Law The Principal's 
Role (Chapel Hill: Institute of Government, 1981), p. 59. 
40Robert E. Phay and George T. Rogister, Jr., "Searches of Students 
and the Fourth Amendment," School Law Bulletin. 6, No. 1, (January 
1975), p. 1. 
41People v. Bowers, 72 Misc. 2d 800, 339 N.Y.3. 783, 803 (Crim Ct. 
1973). 
42In re Dominic W., 426 A. 2d 432 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981). 
43Belliner v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47 (1977). 
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higher standard as outlined in Mapp.44 A two hour search of fifth graders 
ordered to strip to their underclothes was deemed invalid because there had 
been no individualized suspicion. The court did acknowledge that 
reasonableness would have been sufficient had a particularized suspicion 
been made.45 In M. M. v. Anker46 the court made clear . . that as the 
intrusiveness of the search intensifies, the standard of the Fourth 
Amendment 'reasonableness' approaches probable cause, even in the 
school context."47 It is important to note that the student searched was 
found in a classroom during a fire drill, refused to give her name to the 
teacher, claimed a handbag belonged to her and later admitted that it did 
not, admitted to stealing posters from the classroom, and was known to a 
teacher as having stolen on previous occasions. When the student refused 
to reveal what was stuffed in her jeans, a strip search was performed.48 
PERSONAL SEARCH (DRUGS) 
In a majority of cases involving the personal search of students for 
drugs, the courts have held to a standard of reasonableness. The 
exceptions have been for good cause. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals 
44Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
45Belliner v. Lund, 438 F. Supp. 47, 53 (1977). 
4%I. M. v. Anker, 607 F. 2d 588 (1979). 
47Ibid., p. 589. 
48M. M. v. Anker, 477 F. Supp. 837 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). 
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refused to exclude from evidence drugs found during a principal's 
warrantless search of a student. The court held that the student's absence 
from an assigned class coupled with a visible bulge in a pocket, provided 
reasonable suspicion to allow the principal to conduct a search.49 Likewise 
the Supreme Court of Georgia upheld the search of a student initiated only 
by suspicious behavior. The principal had noticed the student putting 
something into his pocket in a suspicious manner.50 
In the 1977 State v. McKinnon51 case police furnished a school's 
principal with detailed information that a particular student was 
transporting drugs to school. The court held that reasonable suspicion was 
sufficient to justify the resulting school search. The court stated that: 
Although a student's right to be free from intrusion is not to be lightly 
disregarded, for us to hold school officials to the standard of probable 
cause required of law enforcement officials would create an 
unreasonable burden upon these school officials. Maintaining 
discipline in schools often times requires immediate action and 
cannot await the procurement of a search warrant based on probable 
cause. We hold that the search of a student's person is reasonable 
and does not violate his Fourth Amendment rights, if the school 
official has reasonable grounds to believe the search is necessary in 
the aid of maintaining school discipline and order.52 
In State v. F.W.E..53 the Florida District Court of Appeals held as 
reasonable, a search of a student's pockets based on a conversation 
49Rannigerv. State, 460 S.W. 2d 181 (1970). 
50State v. Young, 216 S.E. 2d 586, cert, denied. 423 U.S. 1039 (1975). 
51State v. McKinnon, 558 P. 2d 781 (Wash. 1977). 
52Ibid. Another police initiated search was upheld in People v. 
Boettner, 80 Misc. 2d 3, 362 N.Y.S. 2d 365 (1974). 
53State v. F.W.E., 360 So. 2d 148 (Fla. App. 1978). 
52 
overheard by the school's principal.54 Even a strip search was upheld in 
Rone v. Daviess County Board of Education.55 The court indicated the 
search was reasonable since it was based on information that Rone had 
passed prescription drugs to fellow students and that he had given 
marijuana to two students the day before the search.56 In the 1983 R.C.M. 
v. State57 pocket search for drugs was deemed reasonable based on the facts 
that the student searched was out of class without permission, was 
belligerent, acted erratic, and had red eyes. 
In People v. Jackson58 the search of a student by a coordinator of 
discipline in a New York high school was deemed reasonable based upon 
information received, on visual inspection of a bulge in the student's pocket, 
and suspicious behavior which included running from the coordinator. In 
the 1978 Mercer v. State59 decision, reasonableness to search the pockets of 
Robert Mercer was established by a tip received by the dean of men. The 
dean in turn threatened to call Mercer's father if he did not empty his 
55Rone v. Daviess County Bd. of Educ., 655 S.W. 2d 28 (Ky. Ct. App. 
1983). 
56Ibid., p. 29. 
5?R.C.M. v. State, 660 S.W. 2d 552 (Tex. Crim App. 1983). 
58People v. Jackson, 319 N.Y. 2d 731 (1971). 
59Mercer v. State, 450 S.W. 2d 715 (1970). 
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pockets. Mercer complied and the dean called not only his father but also 
the police.60 
In the 1970 In re G.61 case information supplied by a student 
informer coupled with the principal's personal observation of intoxicated 
behavior was sufficient to warrant a reasonable search of a California 
student. Likewise in People v. Glover.62 the search of Tommy Glover by a 
school security guard was judged reasonable based on information supplied 
by "confidential informants" and on the knowledge of Glover's previous 
admission to possession of narcotics.63 And in M. v. Board of Educ. Ball-
Chatham Commun. School Dist.64 the court found the school 
administrator's search to be reasonable based on information supplied by 
an informant that a student had a large amount of money and possibly 
drugs in his possession.65 In the 1980 In re J.A.66 case the Illinois Court of 
Appeals also held as reasonable a search based on a tip received by a school 
60Ralph D. Stern, ed., The School Principal and the Law (Topeka, 
Kansas: National Organization on Legal Problems of Education, 1978), p. 
175. 
61 In re G., 90 Cal. Rptr. 361 (1970). 
62People v. Glover, 173 N.Y.L.J. 19 (Jan. 2,1975). 
63Stern, p. 177. 
64M. v. Board of Educ. Ball-Chatham Commun. School Dist. No. 5, 
Chatham, Illinois, 429 F. Supp. 288 (1977). 
65West's General Digest. Fifth Series. (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 
1980), Vol. 5, p. 1637. 
66In re J. A., 406 N.E. 2d 958 (111 App. 1980). 
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dean. Although the tip alone would not have been sufficient to establish 
"probable cause," the court focused on the role of the dean, whose duties 
included the protection of the health and safety of all students. The tip was 
therefore sufficient to provide "reasonable suspicion." 
OTHER SEARCHES 
A Kentucky court in Bahr v. Jenkins67 upheld the suspension of a 
female student based on her refusal to allow school officials to search her 
purse for firecrackers. The girl had been identified by several informants 
as the source of the firecrackers. The judge insisted that the maintenance 
of discipline in the educational environment is a legitimate role of the 
teacher. Moreover, teachers cannot be expected to go to the court house and 
obtain a search warrant to conduct a search such as the one attempted to 
discover the source of a serious school disturbance.68 
In Stern v. New Haven Community Schools.69 a Michigan court 
upheld the use of a two-way mirror in a boys' restroom to observe sale of 
marijuana by a student to his classmate. Reasonableness of the search was 
". . . approached by balancing school's interest in search and student's 
67Bahr v. Jenkins, 539 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Ky. 1982). 
68Ibid., p. 487. 
69Stern v. New Haven Community Schools, 529 F. Supp. 31 (E.D. 
Mich. 1981). 
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interest in privacy."70 A Florida Court in Nelson v. State71 upheld as 
reasonable the search of a student predicated on the principal's having 
smelled marijuana smoke in proximity to the student. The court reasoned 
that crime and drug abuse had "... reached such a high level that a state of 
emergency constantly exists, thus lowering the Fourth Amendment 
standards."72 Merely looking suspicious was sufficient, in yet another 
Florida case W.J.S. v. Florida73 to merit a "reasonable" search. And in In 
re John Doe VIII v. New Mexico74 the observance by a school administrator 
of a student smoking a pipe during class change was accepted as 
reasonable cause to justify a personal search. In Ohio, two school officials 
viewed suspicious behavior that indicated the possible use and sale of 
marijuana. The court in Tarbuck v. Ravbuck75 also found this to be 
sufficient justification for a reasonable search. 
In People v. Singletarv76 heroin was discovered in a student's sock 
during a search by the school's dean. The search was deemed reasonable 
by the court based on the information supplied to the dean by an 
™Ibid., p. 32. 
71Nelson v. State, 319 So. 2d 154 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1975). 
72Ibid., p. 156. 
73W.J.S. v. Florida, 409 So. 2d 1209 (1982). 
74In re John Doe VIII v. New Mexico, 540 P. 2d 827 (N.M. App. 1975). 
75Tarbuck v. Raybuck, 556 F. Supp. 625 (N.D. Ohio 1983). 
76People v. Singletary, 333 N.E. 2d 369 (1975). 
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unidentified informant.77 The discovery of hashish in a student's coat was 
sanctioned by the court in State v. Baccino.78 The coat was confiscated by 
the vice-principal because the student was cutting class. The search of the 
coat was prompted by the administrator's knowledge that the student had ". 
. . experimented with drugs in the past."79 
In State of Louisiana v. Mora80 a physical education teacher observed 
what he described as suspicious behavior of a student, and searched the 
student's wallet. The wallet, containing marijuana, had been entrusted to 
the teacher's care via a class valuables' bag. A divided court found the 
search to be unreasonable and excluded the drugs from being introduced 
into evidence. 
In People v. Scott D.81 search of a seventeen year old student, based on 
a "hunch" that he was dealing drugs, was ruled as improper and his 
criminal conviction vacated. The student had been observed entering a 
boys' restroom twice in one hour with another student and then leaving 
within a few seconds. He had also been under suspicion for six months, 
been in the company of others under suspicion, and had been identified by a 
"confidential" informant as a drug dealer. 
Wlbid., p. 370. 
78State v. Baccino, 282 A. 2d 869 (Del. Super. 1971). 
79Ibid., p. 870. 
80State of Louisiana v. Mora, 307 So. 2d 317 (1975). 
81 People v. Scott D., 315 N.E. 2d 466 (1974). 
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In the 1976 Picha82 case the principal called police to be present for a 
search of two junior high school students suspected of possessing drugs, 
the court found that the police involvement called for a higher standard of 
"probable cause." In the 1980 Doe v. Renfrow83 decision the court insisted 
that the strip search of another junior high school student was 
unreasonable. The search was instigated after a drug sniff dog alerted to 
the student. The court acknowledged that reasonable suspicion was 
present for a pocket search but not for the excessively intrusive search that 
resulted. 
Two other cases which involved the use of drug sniffing dogs also 
resulted in the court's decision to require the higher standard of probable 
cause for a personal search. In Jones v. Latexo84 the court stated that. . . 
"where there were no facts to raise reasonable suspicion regarding specific 
students, school officials exceeded the bounds of reasonableness in using 
sniffer dog to inspect virtually the entire student body.85 And in Horton v. 
Goose Creek86 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals concurred that the use of 
sniff dogs to detect drugs on students, without establishing individualized 
suspicion, was a violation of the student's constitutional rights. Citing 
y^Picha v. Wielgos, 410 F. Supp. 1214 (N.D. 111. 1976). 
83Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F. 2d 91 (1980), cert, denied 101 S. Ct. 3015 (1981). 
84Jones v. Latexo Independent School Dist., 499 F. Supp. 223 (E.D. 
Texas 1980). 
85Ibid., p. 226. 
86Horton v. Goose Creek Indp. School Dist., 667 F. 2d 471 (1982), 690 F. 
2d 470 (1982). 
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United States v. Goldstein.87 the court in Horton upheld as reasonable the 
use of dogs to sniff cars and lockers. 
School administrators generally have not faired well in search cases 
that have involved strip searches. In Bilbrev v. Brown88 a school bus driver 
observed what she described as "suspicious behavior" of two elementary 
students who appeared to be exchanging money for what she suspected was 
drugs. The strip search of one boy by the school's principal was deemed 
unreasonable.89 Noted by the court was the school district's own policy 
requiring "probable cause" to search.90 
In Kuehn v. Renton School District91 the courts found that a 
generalized search of students' luggage by parent chaperones prior to a 
band trip was unreasonable because there was a total absence of factors to 
justify a search. 
The reasonable belief standard requires that there be a reasonable 
belief on the part of the searching school official that the individual 
student searched possesses a prohibited item. When school officials 
search large groups of students solely for the purpose of deterring 
disruptive conduct and without any suspicion of each individual 
searched, the search does not meet the reasonable belief standard.92 
S7United States v. Goldstein, 452 U.S. 962 (1981). 
88Bilbrey v. Brown, 738 F. 2d 1462 (9th Cir. 1984). 
89Ibid., p. 1464. 
90Ibid., p. 1466. 
91Kuehn v. Renton School Dist., 103 Wash. 2d 594, 598 P. 2d 1078 
(1985). 
92Ibid., p. 1079. 
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IN LOCO PARENTIS 
In most search and seizure cases prior to T.L.O.93 the issue of in loco 
parentis was specifically mentioned or implied in the court's findings. 
This "in place of parent" doctrine has served to give school personnel the 
right to search without first obtaining a search warrant as required of 
"state agents" by the Constitution.94 But what parent would conduct a 
search of their own child, call the police and have him arrested, and then 
turn the evidence over to be used in a criminal proceeding against him?95 
Many states have statutes establishing school officials with in loco 
parentis powers to maintain safety and discipline of students.96 In Axtell v. 
La Penna97 the court simply stated that: 
It is clear that . . . in loco parentis . , . was never intended to invest 
the schools with all the authority of parents over their minor 
children, but only such control as is necessary to prevent infractions 
of discipline and interference with the educational process.98 
93New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985). 
94Margaret Verble, "The Law and Classroom Discipline," American 
Educator (Spring, 1981), pp. 186-188. 
95Louis A. Trosch et al.. "Public School Searches and the Fourth 
Amendment," Journal of Law and Education. II (January 1982), p. 53. 
96Philip K. Piele, The Yearbook of School Law 1977 (Topeka, Kansas: 
National Organization of Legal Problems of Education, 1977), p. 130. 
97Axtell v. La Penna, 323 F. Supp. 1077 (1971). 
98Ibid., p. 1080. 
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In Picha v. Wielpos" the court reasoned that state statutes 
establishing in loco parentis were never intended to allow school officials to 
transcend the constitutional rights of children—"As its constitutional 
maximum, an in loco parentis statute merely codifies a substantial state 
interest against which constitutional rights must be balanced."100 
Although reasonable suspicion played the biggest part in the court's 
decision in People v. Jackson101 the concept of in loco parentis was used to 
bolster the decision.102 The court stated that: 
The in loco parentis doctrine is so compelling in light of public 
necessity and as a social concept antedating the Fourth Amendment, 
that any action, including a search, taken thereunder upon 
reasonable suspicion, should be accepted as necessary and 
reasonable.103 
The courts, however, have not alv/ays found school officials to be 
acting in loco parentis while conducting school searches. Cases where this 
has occurred have generally followed one of three patterns; (1) the search 
produced contraband that was turned over to the police for prosecution; (2) 
involved searches that exceeded reasonable limits such as the intrusive 
yypicha v. Wielgos, 410 F. Supp. 1211 (N.D. 111. 1976). 
10°Ibid., pp. 1218-1219. 
101 People v. Jackson, 65 Misc. 2d 909, 319 N.Y.S. 2d 731 (1971), afTd 30 
N.Y. 2d 734, 333 N.Y.S. 2d 167, 285 N.E. 2d 153 (1972). 
102Donoghoe, p. 454. 
103People v. Jackson, 319 N.Y.S. 2d 731, 736 (1971). 
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strip search; and (3) involved searches that were not justified at their 
inception by sufficient facts.104 
The majority of litigation involving school searches has indeed relied 
on the common sense judgment of officials performing search based on 
identified and articulated facts. With a small percentage of exceptions, the 
cases have produced a standard to determine reasonableness on criteria 
based upon personal judgment, information from secret informants, 
suspicious behaviors, bulges in pockets, the alert of a drug-sniffing dog, 
knowledge of past incidents, and outright personal observation. The 
Supreme Court on several occasions denied certiorari giving tacit approval 
to the arguments and findings of the lower courts. It was therefore the 
desire of many that the first Supreme Court case involving search and 
seizure in the American public schools would be the panacea for all 
questions involving school searches. 
T.L.O- THE IMPERFECT PANACEA 
New Jersey v. T.L.O.105 is the first case granted certiorari by the 
United States Supreme Court. The case was originally accepted for the 
purpose of examining the appropriateness of the "exclusionary rule." The 
1U4H. C. Hudgins, Jr. and Richard S. Vacca, Law and Education: 
Contemporary Issues and Court Decisions (Charlottesville, Virginia: The 
Michie Co., 1985), p. 309. 
105New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985). 
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subject of the search, Terry Lee Owens,106 sought to have excluded from 
evidence illegal materials discovered in her purse. The Supreme Court 
apparently concerned that it was being presented "the cart before the 
horse,"107 postponed its judgment concerning the exclusionary rule and 
ordered reargument on the basic issue of what standard should be used to 
assess the legality of searches by school personnel.108 
The standard established by the Supreme Court was 
"reasonableness" and not probable cause. The Court stated: 
. . . [Accommodation of privacy . . . interests of schoolchildren with 
the substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to 
maintain order in the schools does not require strict adherence to the 
requirement that searches be based on probable cause to believe that 
the subject of the search has violated or is violating the law; rather, 
the legality of search of a student should depend simply on the 
reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search.109 
The determination of reasonableness, stated the Court, depended 
upon a twofold inquiry. First, was the action taken "justified at its 
inception." Second, was the search "... reasonably related in scope to 
circumstances which justified interference in the first place."110 
106David O. Stewart, "And In Her Purse the Principal Found 
Marijuana," ABA Journal. Vol. 71 (February 1985), p. 51. 
107George T. Rogister, Jr., et al.. "New Jersey v. T.L.O.: The 
Supreme Court Applies the Fourth Amendment to Public Schools," The 
Network. V, No. 5, (February 1985), p. 3. 
108New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 736 (1985). 
109Ibid., pp. 743-744. 
110Ibid., p. 734. 
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Justification at its inception, the Court reasoned, should be 
determined by the presence of "reasonable grounds for suspecting that the 
search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating 
either the law or rules of the school."111 To determine permissible scope the 
Court stated that: 
. . .  a  s e a r c h  w i l l  b e  p e r m i s s i b l e  i n  i t s  s c o p e  w h e n  t h e  m e a s u r e s  
adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not 
excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the 
nature of the infraction.112 
The Court applied its twofold inquiry to the search conducted in 
T.L.O. Since the case involved two searches, the Court inspected both. The 
search of a purse for cigarettes was deemed reasonable based on a teacher's 
report that student was smoking. Rolling papers left in plain view after 
removal of the cigarettes, in turn, established reasonable suspicion for the 
second search for drugs.113 The Court further upheld reasonableness of 
scope of the search. Owens contended that the administrator had exceeded 
permissible bounds because personal letters, that further implicated her in 
drug deals, were read.114 Although the Court upheld scope of the search, it 
was Justice John Paul Stevens, a dissenter, who explained the necessity of 
this "rider" to the Court's standard.115 
i^Ibid., p. 744. 
112Ibid. 
113Ibid., p. 746. 
114Ibid., pp. 746-747. 
115Rogister, p. 5. 
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The Court's standard for evaluating the "scope" of reasonable school 
searches is obviously designed to prohibit physically intrusive 
searches of students by persons of the opposite sex for relatively 
minor offenses.116 
The long standing question concerning the application of in loco 
parentis was also addressed by the Court. Citing R.C.M. v. State117 as a 
typical statement of the application of this doctrine, the Court simply stated 
that in loco parentis was ". . .in tension with contemporary reality and the 
teachings of this Court."118 Just as school personnel were identified as 
state agents in respect to students' right to free speech in Tinker119 and to 
students' right to due process in Goss120 so too are school personnel 
representatives of the state in regards to search of students and seizure of 
their property.121 
The T.L.O. decision has also left many questions unanswered. Even 
though initial certiorari was granted in order to answer the exclusionary 
rule issue, the issue became moot when the Court ruled that search of 
Owens was valid. Furthermore the Court was silent on locker and property 
protections, the status of reasonable suspicion and on probable cause when 
police are involved in the search. Neither did the Court answer issues 
llbNew Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 765 (1985). 
117R.C.M. v. State, 660 S.W. 2d 552 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). 
118New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 741 (1985). 
119Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 89 
S. Ct. 733 (1969). 
120Goss v. Lopez, 95 S. Ct. 729 (1975). 
121 New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 741 (1985). 
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about individualized suspicion or the use of dogs to ferret out illicit drugs. 
Collectively these issues are too great in number and too significant to leave 
practicing administrators without concerns.122 
It is significant to note the vehement dissent of Justice William 
Brennan, Jr., who argued that search of Owen's purse was too intrusive 
and the balancing test established by the majority was flawed.123 Brennan 
went on to state: 
I cannot but believe that the same school system faced with 
interpreting what is permitted under the Court's new 
"reasonableness" standard would be hopelessly adrift as to when a 
search may be permissible. The sad result of this uncertainty may 
well be that some teachers will be reluctant to conduct searches that 
are fully permissible and even necessary under the constitutional 
probable-cause standard, while others may intrude arbitrarily and 
unjustifiably on the privacy of students.124 
Justice Stevens feared the decision would prompt school personnel to 
conduct searches for violation of the "... most trivial school regulations 
and guidelines for behavior."125 Justice Stevens concurred with Justice 
Brennan that the "... search of a young woman's purse by a school 
administrator is a serious invasion of her legitimate expectations of 
privacy."126 Of special concern to Justice Stevens was his abhorrence for 
the strip search. Footnoted in his dissent was this comment: 
122Rogister, pp. 7-9. 
123New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 752 (1985). 
124Ibid., pp. 756-757. 
125Ibid., p. 759. 
126Ibid., p. 762. 
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One thing is clear under any standard-the shocking strip searches 
that are described in some cases have no place in the school house . . 
. . ("It does not require a constitutional scholar to conclude that a 
nude search of a 13-year-old child is an invasion of constitutional 
rights of some magnitude.127 
REASONABLENESS-POST-T.L.O. 
Cases litigated in the courts since T.L.O. all involved actual school 
searches that were conducted by school personnel prior to the Court's 
landmark decision. Therefore search participants were not afforded the 
opportunity of knowing specifics of the Supreme Court's decision nor of the 
Court's expectation of a twofold inquiry. In virtually all post-T.L.O. cases 
this twofold inquiry was reviewed and applied to the search at hand. Each 
case, however, must be examined at on its own merits relative to the 
specific circumstances for establishing a reasonable search. 
In Martens v. District No. 220.128 an anonymous telephone caller 
advised a school's dean of students that a student had sold drugs to her 
daughter at school. An earlier call from a similar anonymous caller 
provided factual information on another unrelated drug incident. Despite 
the fact that a police officer was actually involved in the search, the court 
held that the anonymous tip was sufficient to justify the search. The 
student, who was asked to empty his pockets by a police officer, who just 
happened to be on campus at the time, sought to have a pipe, tainted with 
i^Ibid., p. 765. 
128Martens v. District No. 220, Bd. of Educ., 620 F. Supp. 29 (D.C. 111. 
1985). 
67 
marijuana residue, excluded from evidence at his expulsion hearing. The 
court, however, found the search not only justified at inception but also 
reasonable in scope.129 The reasonableness concept hinged on the "totality-
of-circumstances test" developed in the Supreme Court's Gates130 decision. 
The court first reasoned that the anonymous tip was "inherently 
plausible" since a drug problem was known to exist at the school and that 
numerous students had been expelled prior to the search. Second, the tip 
came from the public which the court believed added to its credibility. 
Third, there was reason to believe the tip was accurate based on similarities 
of the caller to another caller that had provided factual information. And 
finally, the allegation gave specific detail to the student's "role as a drug 
distributor" and to the location where illegal items were allegedly being 
secreted.131 
Since the T.L.O. decision did not address police involvement, the 
Martens' court made clear its finding that the deputy's involvement was 
only incidental. The law officer had not been involved in investigating the 
case, did not help develop the facts, and merely advised the student that he 
should cooperate and empty his pockets.132 
129Ibid., pp. 30-31. 
130Hlinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983). 
131 Martens v. District No. 220, Bd. of Educ., 620 F. Supp. 29, 32 (1985). 
132Ibid. 
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In the 1985 In re Bobbv B.133 case a student, subjected to a 
warrantless search by an administrative dean of boys, sought to have seized 
marijuana and cocaine excluded from evidence used against him in a 
criminal proceeding. The search was conducted after the administrator 
found the student out of class without a pass. Based on the nervous 
behavior of the student and the knowledge that a drug problem existed at 
school, the court applied T.L.O.'s twofold inquiry and found the search to be 
justified at its inception and reasonable in its scope. 
It is interesting to note the only other factor mentioned in 
determining justification of the search was the dean's stated belief that the 
area where the student was found was reputed to be frequented by drug 
dealers. The marijuana was not found in the initial search of the pockets 
but rather after the dean looked into the student's billfold.134 
In the 1985 State v. Joseph T.135 case the search of a student's locker 
was based on indirect information given to an assistant principal by a 
student whose breath smelled of alcohol. Again the court applied the 
twofold inquiry and, as in the cases before, found the search to be justified 
at its inception and reasonable in scope. The student's appeal to have 
marijuana and related paraphernalia excluded from his criminal 
prosecution was denied.136 It is interesting to note that no nexus was 
133In re Bobby B., 218 Cal. Rptr. 253 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1985). 
134Ibid., p. 255. 
135State v. Joseph T., 336 S.E. 2d 728 (W. Va. 1985). 
136Ibid., pp. 731-736. 
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established between the locker and suspicion that student had alcohol 
stored therein. In fact, the admitted consumption of alcohol had taken 
place at the student's home before school commenced. Nevertheless the 
court held that while probable cause certainly could not be established, 
there was sufficient evidence for "reasonable suspicion."137 
The dissent of Justice J. McGraw is interesting to note: 
In the present case, there were no articulable facts which would lead 
a reasonably prudent person to suspect the defendant had alcoholic 
beverages in his locker. The only evidence was that his friend had 
consumed a beer at the defendant's home before school . . . ,138 
Justice McGraw further objected to the search because when no 
alcohol was found, the search continued, even to the pockets of the 
defendant's coat. The presence of alcoholic beverages, Justice McGraw 
reasoned, could have been ascertained by a mere pat down of the jacket 
rather than the "detailed examination" that actually took place.139 
All post-T.L.O. courts have not been so easily persuaded in 
establishing justification for student searches. In re William G.140 involved 
the forcible confiscation of a student's calculator case by an assistant 
principal predicated on the belief that an "unusual" bulge in the case might 
contain narcotics. The court found this to be insufficient to justify a search. 
The court in making this decision applied the T.L.O. twofold inquiry. The 
court was most persuaded by testimony from the assistant principal that he 
137Ibid., p. 737. 
138Ibid., p. 741. 
139Ibid. 
140In re William G., 709 P. 2d 1287 (Cal. 1985). 
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had no information the student had ever been involved in drugs. 
Furthermore, suspicion that student was tardy to class and absence of an 
factors establishing an exigency situation, only enhanced the court's 
finding that no articulative facts were present to justify a reasonable 
search.141 
Two main points were made by the assistant principal. The student 
attempted to hide the calculator case from view, even to deny its existence, 
and demanded vehemently that the administrator could not search him or 
his property without a search warrant. In regards to the demand for a 
warrant the court wrote: 
There are many reasons why a student might assert these rights, 
other than an attempt to prevent disclosure of evidence that one has 
violated a proscribed activity. A student cannot be penalized for 
demanding respect for his or her constitutional rights.14* 
The preponderance of evidence was significantly greater in State v. 
Brooks.143 A locker search that produced hallucinogenic mushrooms was 
found to be legally sound after being reviewed against the T.L.O. twofold 
inquiry.144 The justification was based upon four critical factors which 
combined produced a reasonable search. These were: (1) information 
received from student informant; (2) reports by several teachers having 
witnessed the student on earlier occasions in an intoxicated state; (3) 
documentation that the parents had been warned and advised on earlier 
141Ibid., pp. 1296-1297. 
142Ibid., p. 1297. 
143State v. Brooks, 718 P. 2d 837 (Wash. App. 1986). 
144Ibid., p. 839. 
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occasions of the school's suspicions; and (4) the student's habit of 
frequenting an area identified for its high drug use.145 
Of special note was the court's reliance and recognition of facts 
established much earlier in McKinnon.146 These factors used to determine 
reasonableness include age of the child, history, school record, the extent of 
the problem to which the search is directed, the need to search without 
delay (exigency) and the "probative value and reliability of the information 
used as a justification for the search."147 
In the 1985 Gales v. Howell Public Schools148 decision a United States 
District Court in Michigan found that the strip search of a fifteen year old 
female student was reasonably related to the scope of the search despite 
their concomitant finding that the search was not even justified at its 
inception. Justice John Paul Stevens' footnote in T.L.O. raised the 
constitutional issue related to a strip search.149 
The subject of the search came to the attention of a male 
administrator when she was observed "ducking" behind cars in the student 
parking lot by a school security guard. The administrator searched the 
145Ibid., p. 837. 
146State v. McKinnon, 558 P. 2d 781 (Wash. 1977). 
147State v. Brooks, 718 P. 2d 837, 840, 841 (Wash. App. 1986). 
148Cales v. Howell Public Schools, 635 F. Supp. 454 (E.D. Mich. 
1985). 
149This footnote to Justice Stevens' dissent outlines the Justice's 
abhorrence to strip search as a reasonable exercise of school authority 
under any circumstances. 
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girl's purse and found "readmittance" slips belonging to the school's office. 
A second assistant principal (female) was instructed by the first (male) to 
strip search.150 The court held that "funny" behavior in a parking lot did 
not justify the search at its inception.151 On question of immunity, the court 
reasoned that the strip search for drugs by female administrator was 
reasonable related to the objective of the search, and therefore she was 
entitled to "qualified immunity." Not so with the male assistant who was 
knowledgeable of the necessity to establish reasonable suspicion based on 
evidence.152 
The District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District, upheld in 
R.D.L. v. State153 that an assistant principal's search of a student's locker 
was constitutional. Three specific facts led the court to believe that search 
was justified at its inception. The defendant had been observed in an area 
where a theft had occurred; the defendant had been observed concealing a 
"pot of honey" stolen from a home economics classroom; and stolen articles 
fell to the floor when the defendant was ordered to open his locker. Having 
determined the search was justified at its inception, the court also found 
the locker search to be reasonably related to the circumstances. Yet a 
15t)Cales v. Howell Public Schools, 635 F. Supp. 454, 455, 456 (E.D. 
Mich. 1985). 
151 Ibid., p. 457. 
152Ibid., p. 458. 
153R.D.L. v. State, 499 So. 2d 31 (1986). 
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Pennsylvania case In Interest of Dumas154 found that an assistant 
principal's search of student's locker for drugs was unconstitutional. In 
this case a student's locker was searched after the assistant principal was 
advised by a teacher the student had taken cigarettes from his locker and 
gave one to a classmate. The court reasoned that the seizure of cigarettes 
from the student's hands was justified but not the continued search for 
cigarettes in the locker. 
SUMMARY 
The Supreme Court's decision in T.L.O.155 established that school 
personnel could conduct legal searches of students based on "reasonable 
suspicion" and not probable cause. The school search cases that continued 
to accumulate after 1969 focused on issues that had been individually 
litigated in criminal cases prior to that date. Pre-T.L.O. cases when viewed 
collectively, relative to establishing reasonableness, provide a composite 
similar to the Court's decision in T.L.O. The Supreme Court acknowledged 
that in loco parentis concept was in tension with the Court's decisions in 
the last twenty years. However, the Court left questions unanswered about 
lockers, autos, drug-detecting canines, suppression of evidence, and police 
involvement. 
Although many pre-T.L.O. courts varied on interpretation of issues 
and placed different weights on key factors, a standard of reasonableness 
154In Interest of Dumas, 515 A. 2d 984, 986 (1986). 
155New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985). 
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was indeed emerging. Several key tests used by the Justices in deciding 
T.L.O. were first communicated in pre-T.L.O. cases. The two-pronged test 
cited In re W.156 and the factors established in McKinnon.157 for example, 
were incorporated in the T.L.O. decision. 
The key issue in the T.L.O. decision was the development of a twofold 
inquiry to determine the legality of a school search. The first question of 
this inquiry simply asked if the search was justified at its beginning. Were 
there sufficient factors to justify confrontation and a concomitant need to 
search? The second question involved the measures adopted by the school 
personnel to conduct the search. Were the measures (the scope) reasonably 
related to the factors that justified the search in the first place? The Court's 
T.L.O. decision was found for the State of New Jersey on a narrow margin 
and dissent was lengthy and vehement. 
Cases that have been litigated since T.L.O. have predictably relied on 
the twofold inquiry. There is, however, the ever present subjectivity that 
must be applied to factors related to a search. The fact still remains that 
justices will disagree over issues and apply their own judgment concerning 
reasonableness. Cases post-T.L.O. have exhibited this inevitable pitfall. 
The simple fact remains that human judgment will continue to assign 
values and weights to issues and circumstances. No test has been 
developed to weigh specific factors. What may be acceptable factors to 
justify a search at its inception to one court, may indeed be unacceptable to 
another. 
i5bin re W., 29 Cal. App. 3d 777,105 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1973). 
157State v. McKinnon, 558 P. 2d 781 (Wash. 1977). 
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The Court in its wisdom did not attempt to produce a formula 
whereby all factors could be plugged in and the answer would emerge on 
the opposite end of the equals mark. 
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CHAPTER IV 
REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF COURT DECISIONS 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents a review and analysis of significant judicial 
decisions both before, after, and including the Supreme Court's T.L.O. 
decision. Care has been taken to select cases that best represent issues 
relative to search and seizure before T.L.O. This is especially difficult 
because of the plethora of cases and the diversity of issues. The landmark 
T.L.O. decision is reviewed in detail as well as the significant search and 
seizure cases litigated after T.L.O. Discussion of each case is presented as 
it pertains to its unique issues concomitant with the emergence of 
reasonableness as a standard for school personnel to conduct searches. 
The cases reviewed are listed below: 
1. Pre-T.L.O.: 
State v. Stein (1969) 
In re W. (1973) 
People v. Scott D. (1974) 
State v. Young (1974) 
State v. McKinnon (1977) 
Doe v. Renfrow (1979) 
Stern v. New Haven Community Schools (1981) 
Bilbrev v. Brown (1984) 
2. New Jersey v. T.L.O. (1985) 
3. Post-T.L.O 
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Martens v. District No. 220 (1985) 
In re Bobbv B. (1985) 
State v. Joseph T. (1985) 
In re William G. (1985) 
Cales v. Howell Public Schools (1985) 
State v. Brooks (1986) 
R.D.L. v. State (1986) 
In Interest of Dumas (1986) 
The landmark United States Supreme Court decision of New Jersey 
v. T.L.O. was dependent upon review of many cases decided in lower 
courts. Although contradictions did emerge, there is little argument that a 
rationale slowly developed to indicate that school personnel, because of the 
unique student relationship, would be held to a lesser standard than would 
other governmental agents. The cases after T.L.O. have each relied heavily 
on the Court's decision but have varied in their application of its inquiry 
process. 
SEARCHES PRE-T.L.O. 
Overview 
Historically, the development of standards to guide school personnel 
in conducting student searches has evolved quickly and over a relatively 
short period of time. The Supreme Court, although given several 
opportunities to review lower court decisions, was not involved in any 
school decision involving search and seizure prior to its 1985 decision in 
T.L.O. Nevertheless, the Court's involvement in earlier criminal cases 
provided the lower courts significant guidelines as a standard of 
reasonableness began to emerge. 
The pre-T.L.O. cases selected here in no way reflect all search related 
issues. Selection was particularly based on the court's establishment of a 
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procedure to assist school personnel as they evaluated specific situations 
and partially unique circumstances involved in the case. 
State v. Stein 
203 Kan. 638,456 P. 2d 1 (1969) 
cert, denied 90 S. Ct. 966 (1970) 
Facts 
On January 23, 1968, police officers visited Ottawa High School in 
Ottawa, Kansas and requested that the locker of student Madison Stein be 
searched. The principal, along with Stein and the two law enforcement 
officers, went to Stein's locker which Stein voluntarily consented to open. 
The officers were investigating the burglary of Butler's Music Store in 
Ottawa which had occurred the night before. Cash, coins and guns had 
been taken in the theft and Stein was a suspect.1 
Having voluntarily opened the locker, Stein further consented to the 
police officers' search of items in the locker. The officers found a key 
secreted in the bottom of a pack of cigarettes which Stein said opened a 
locker at the Kansas City Union Station where he had left some clothes. A 
check by police revealed that the key instead fit a locker at the Lawrence Bus 
Depot.2 
The police went to the bus depot and in the locker found the items 
stolen from Butler's Music Store. Stein was charged with burglary and 
grand theft. Stein sought to suppress the evidence based on an assertion 
1 State v. Stein, 456 P. 2d 1, 2 (1969). 
2Ibid. 
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that the school locker search was in violation of his constitutional rights. 
The officers, he maintained, had failed to give him a Miranda warning.3 
Nevertheless, Stein was convicted. He appealed his conviction to the 
Supreme Court of Kansas. 
Decision 
The Supreme Court of Kansas upheld Stein's conviction in the lower 
court. No Miranda warning was necessary, and Stein's consent was ruled 
as voluntary by the court. Further the court ruled that a special 
relationship existed when a school maintained dual control of its lockers. 
The court stated: 
Although a student may have control of his school locker as against 
fellow students, his possession is not exclusive against the school and 
its officials. A school does not supply its students with lockers for 
illicit use in harboring pilfered property or harmful substances. We 
deem it a proper function of school authorities to inspect the lockers 
under their control and to prevent their use in illicit ways or for 
illegal purposes. We believe this right of inspection is inherent in the 
authority vested in school administrators and that the same must be 
retained and exercised in the management of our schools if their 
educational functions are to be maintained and the welfare of the 
student bodies preserved.4 
Discussion 
This case is included in the review of pre-T.L.O. cases because of the 
statement concerning dual control of lockers. The last case reviewed in this 
study (the post T.L.O. decision of In Interest of Dumas5) continues to hold 
^TbicL ~ 
4Ibid., pp. 2-3. 
5In Interest of Dumas, 515 A. 2d 984 (1986). 
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the Stein opinion regarding the legality of locker searches. The Miranda 
question was somewhat unique to this case. 
The involvement of police officers is also important. Since the 
Supreme Court did not address this issue in T.L.O.. the lower court 
decisions remain important precedents. The court in Stein relied heavily 
on People v. Overton.6 where the vice-principal gave permission to police to 
search a student's locker.7 Likewise in In re Fred C.8 the court found that 
when information was furnished to the school by police the resulting locker 
search was not a "police search." But in Picha v. Wielgos9 the involvement 
of police raised the required standard for search from reasonable suspicion 
to probable cause. 
In re W. 
29 Cal. App. 3d 777, 
105 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1973) 
Facts 
On September 27, 1971, Oscar Groves, high school assistant 
principal, was informed by four students that a sack of marijuana was in 
locker number B-51. Groves proceeded to the locker and opened it with his 
^People v. Overton, 20 N.Y. 2d 360, 229 N.E. 2d 596, 249 N.E. 2d 366 
(1969). 
7Michael La Morte et al.. Students' Legal Rights and Responsibilities 
(Cincinnati: The W. H. Anderson Co., 1971), p. 151 
«In re Fred C., 26 Cal. App. 3d 320,102 Cal. Rptr. 682 (1972) 
9Picha v. Wielgos, 410 F. Supp. 214 (N.D. 111. 1976). 
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master key. Inside was the bag of marijuana. Having identified the locker 
as belonging to Christopher W., Groves notified the school's principal and 
together they inspected the locker. Christopher W. was then summoned 
and required to open the locker. Christopher acted surprised upon finding 
the marijuana and denied any knowledge of the sack. Christopher was 
suspended from school and advised to get legal counsel.10 
The following day, Christopher returned to school and continued to 
deny any knowledge of the marijuana. The police were notified and an 
investigation was begun. Christopher then spoke privately to the school's 
principal and under a promise of "confidentiality" confessed that the 
marijuana was his, but he feared for his life if he revealed the source. He 
was allowed to return to school. Christopher sought to have the standards 
of the fourth amendment applied to the search of school lockers and have 
his adjudication as a ward of the court overturned.11 
Decision 
The California Court of Appeal upheld the ruling of the county court. 
The court held that while the Fourth Amendment imposed limits on school 
personnel's authority, the doctrine of in loco parentis expanded that 
authority. But this alone was not enough. The court further delineated a 
test to be applied to determine the reasonableness of a search.12 The court 
stated: 
10In re W., 29 Cal. App. 3d 777,105 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1973). 
11 Ibid., pp. 789-790. 
12Ibid., p. 791. 
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We believe that the appropriate test for searches by high school 
officials is two-pronged. The first requirement is that the search be 
within the scope of the school's duties. The second requirement is 
that the action taken, the search, be reasonable under the facts and 
circumstances of the case. Although in loco parentis is applicable, 
the Fourth Amendment limits that power to acts that meet above 
requirements. In this case, prevention of the use of marijuana is 
clearly within the duties of school personnel, and the action taken, 
the verification of the report, was reasonable. The evidence was 
properly admitted.13 
Discussion 
It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio14 first 
expressed a standard for determining reasonable search that precedes the 
test expressed here. Terry first sought to determine if the search was 
justified at its inception and second, if the search ". . . was reasonably 
related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the 
first place."15 The same test was adopted by the Court in New Jersey v. 
T.L.O.16 
The court further confirmed that school personnel are not required to 
give Miranda warnings to students. Christopher suggested that the 
principal's acceptance of his "confidential" confession was in essence a 
denial of legal counsel. The principal had testified in court that 
Christopher had confessed to him. The court reasoned that it was an issue 
13Ibid., p. 794. 
14Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
15Ibid., p. 20. 
16New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 744 (1985) 
83 
o f .  .  m i s p l a c e d  t r u s t .  T h e  p r i n c i p a l  h o n o r e d  C h r i s 1  t r u s t  a s  l o n g  a s  h e  
legally could. It was only in court that he revealed the confession."17 
People v. Scott D. 
315N.E. 2d 466 (1974) 
Facts 
This New York case involved the search of a seventeen-year-old high 
school student named Scott. Within a one-hour period, Scott had been 
observed by a teacher entering a boys' restroom with a fellow student and 
then exiting within five to ten seconds. The teacher reported the suspicious 
behavior to the co-ordinator of school security.18 
Based on information from "confidential sources" Scott had been the 
object of surveillance for six months. During this time he had been 
observed eating lunch with another student suspected of drug involvement. 
The co-ordinator notified the school's principal of the "unusual behavior." 
The principal ordered the student to be brought to his office. Scott was then 
searched by the co-ordinator in the presence of the dean of boys and the 
principal.19 
In his wallet was found thirteen glassine envelopes of white powder. 
This discovery prompted a strip search of Scott during which a vial 
17In re. W., 105 Cal. Rptr. 775, 795 (1973). 
18People v. Scott D., 315 N.E. 2d 466,467 (1974). 
19Ibid., pp. 467-468. 
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containing nine pills was found. These items were introduced into 
evidence against Scott in criminal court. After the court denied Scott's 
motion to suppress evidence found in the search, he pleaded guilty to 
criminal possession of drugs and was adjudged a youthful offender.20 Scott 
appealed to the Court of Appeals of New York.21 
Decision 
The Court of Appeals of New York reversed both lower courts and 
vacated Scott's conviction, holding the search was unjustified based on the 
circumstances presented to the court.22 Looking to the issue of in loco 
p a r e n t i s ,  t h e  c o u r t  h e l d  t h a t  s c h o o l  p e r s o n n e l  s o m e t i m e s  w e r e  " . . .  t o  a  
degree like parents. It is not true, however, that school teachers possess all 
parental perogatives."23 Furthermore the Overton decision concerning the 
search of a student's locker was not applicable and ". . . impersuasive with 
respect to a student's person."24 
The court further recognized that school personnel faced with 
"urgent social necessities" must not be held to the same standards required 
of those . . outside the school precincts."25 The factors to determine if 
sufficient cause is present to conduct a reasonable serach are: (1) the 
20Ibid. t>. 468. 
21 Ibid., p. 466. 
22Ibid. 
23Ibid., p. 468. 
24Ibid., p. 469. 
25Ibid. 
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child's age; (2) the child's history and record in school; (3) the prevalence 
and seriousness of the problem to which the search is directed; and (4) "the 
exigency to make the search without delay."26 
Looking at all factors, the court did not believe that two excursions 
into a restroom could generate more than "equivocal suspicion" that an 
illegal activity was taking place. The court believed that any number of 
"innocent activities" could have prompted Scott's behavior. The 
"confidential information," the court further reasoned, was sufficient to 
justify surveillance but not a search. The court also added that the 
defendant's having had lunch with another student under suspicion was ". 
. . all but meaningless, because contact among students in the school would 
be so likely and so susceptible of innocent explanation."27 
Discussion 
This case enumerated a series of factors to be inspected in 
determining the reasonableness of a school search. Subsequent cases 
relied on the same factors in making their rulings. The court in Scott D. 
was influenced by lack of articulable facts that specifically related to drugs. 
Nothing more than suspicious behavior had occurred. Since the original 
search of the wallet was ruled illegal, the strip search which followed was 
certainly unjustified. The court, however, made this interesting 
observation. 
If there were sufficient basis for a school search, and the glassine 
envelopes were found in defendant's wallet, the further indignity of a 
strip search was warranted, to make sure that defendant did not 
26Ibid., p. 470. 
27Ibid. 
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possess a still larger supply of drugs and to establish the role he 
played in carrying the drugs. That the search was conducted in the 
presence of witnesses, although adding to the indignity, was likewise 
warranted both to provide corroboration of the findings and to prevent 
or counteract false claims of the contraband having been planted on 
the person searched.28 
State v. Young 
216 S.E. 2d 586 (1975) 
Facts 
This case involves the search of a seventeen year old high school 
student by an assistant principal. The student, Russell Young, was 
observed by the administrator in the company of two classmates. Upon 
seeing the assistant principal, one student "... jumped up and put 
something down, ran his hand in his pants." This suspicious behavior 
prompted the assistant principal to take all three boys to his office where he 
. . directed them to empty their pockets." A small amount of marijuana 
was found in Young's jacket pocket. Young was charged and convicted in 
criminal court after his motion to suppress the evidence was denied.29 
Decision 
The Georgia Court of Appeals reversed Scott's conviction and found 
that the assistant principal was acting as a governmental agent and 
therefore should be held to the same requirement for "probable cause" as a 
2«Ibid.,pp. 470-471. 
29Young v. State, 209 S.E. 2d 96, 97 (1974). 
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police officer.30 Eight months later the Supreme Court of Georgia reversed 
the appellate court's decision. Certiorari was granted so that the court 
could determine the application of the Fourth Amendment to school 
searches and the application of the exclusionary rule for evidence obtained 
by school personnel during a search conducted under standard less than 
probable cause.31 In determining the basis for the exclusionary rule, the 
court stated: "There is nothing sacrosanct about the exclusionary rule; it is 
not embedded in the Constitution and it is not a personal constitutional 
right."32 Furthermore, in Georgia where the exclusionary rule is 
embedded in statutory law, the court pointed out that it was applicable 
exclusively to law enforcement officers.33 
The court then reviewed the numerous cases which involved 
determining whether or not school personnel were state agents or private 
persons. In so doing, the court broke new ground and identified a third 
group.34 
We conclude that there are really three groups: private persons; 
governmental agents whose conduct is state action invoking the 
Fourth Amendment; and governmental law enforcement agents for 
whose violations of the Fourth Amendment the exclusionary rule 
will be applied.35 
30Ibid., p. 98. 
31 State v. Young, 216 S.E. 2d 586,588 (1975). 
32Ibid., pp. 589-590. 
33Ibid., p. 590. 
34Ibid., p. 591. 
35Ibid. 
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The court concluded that school personnel fit into the middle group. 
While school personnel are definitely governmental agents required to 
abide by the dictates of the Fourth Amendment, they are not police officers. 
Only law enforcement officials, the court reasoned, could invoke the 
application of the exclusionary rule. Therefore evidence seized by school 
personnel, even by an unjustified search, could not be suppressed as 
evidence in a criminal proceeding.36 
The court now turned its attention specifically to the search of Young 
and determined that the evidence seized should not be suppressed. 
Furthermore, the court found that the assistant principal's search without 
police involvement was not in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The 
court sought to balance governmental interest with that of the individual.37 
The court stated: 
[Administrators must be allowed to search without hindrance or 
delay subject only to the most minimal restraints necessary to insure 
that students are not whimsically stripped of personal privacy and 
subjected to petty tvranny. The search we consider here met this 
minimal standard.3® 
The court specifically believed that the "furtive gesture" of one 
student and the collective and "obvious consciousness of guilt" of all 
three was sufficient to justify the search. This, coupled with the absence 
of police involvement, made the search reasonable.39 
SSIbld! 
37Ibid., p. 592. 
38lbid., pp. 592-593. 
39Ibid., pp. 593-594. 
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Discussion 
This case is significant because it deals in detail on an issue that the 
Supreme Court was originally asked to decide in T.L.O. The Supreme 
Court, however, ordered attorneys to prepare arguments on the more basic 
issue of determining the proper application of the Fourth Amendment to 
school related searches.40 In so doing, the Court never answered the 
exclusionary rule issue. 
State v. McKinnon 
558 P. 2d 781 (1977) 
Facts 
On November 4,1974, the Chief of Police for Snoqualmie, Washington 
telephoned the principal of the local high school to advise him that several 
high school students were selling drugs on campus. The chief had received 
his information from a "confidential informant." He provided the principal 
with details which included how students were dressed and where they had 
drugs hidden on their person. The principal advised the chief that he 
would question the students and let him know the outcome.41 
4UNew Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 736 (1985). 
41 State v. McKinnon, 558 P. 2d 781, 782 (1977). 
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The principal interviewed one student (Yates) and the vice-principal 
another (McKinnon). Both administrators required the students to empty 
their pockets. The principal then reached into the student's pocket 
identified by the chief of police and found two packages of white pills. The 
principal then entered the room where the assistant principal and 
McKinnon were located and likewise found several packages of pills in the 
pocket identified by the police.42 
The chief of police was then summoned and placed both Yates and 
McKinnon under arrest. While on the way to the police station, the chief 
observed McKinnon hide a package under the seat of the patrol car. 
McKinnon was ordered to retrieve the package. This bag, along with 
another that McKinnon voluntarily surrendered, both contained 
marijuana. Both boys sought to have the evidence suppressed at their 
criminal proceedings contending that their Fourth Amendment rights had 
been abridged by an unreasonable search.43 Both boys were found guilty in 
separate trials.44 
Decision 
The Supreme Court of Washington upheld the lower court 
convictions and denied the students' appeal to suppress the evidence. The 
court relied on Young45 to reaffirm that school administrators are not law 
43Ibid., p. 783. 
44Ibid., p. 781. 
45State v. Young, 216 S.E. 2d 586 (1975). 
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enforcement officers and are not subject to the same "probable cause" 
standard.46 People v. D.47 was the source of factors used by the court to 
determine reasonable grounds. These included age, history, record, 
seriousness of the problem, and the exigency to search.48 Applying these 
facts, the court recognized the seriousness of selling drugs in school and 
the need for the search to be conducted without delay. Despite claims to the 
contrary, the court further determined that the police involvement was 
minimal and did not exceed that of providing information to the principal. 
At no time did the chief recommend that a search be conducted.49 The 
court reasoned that: 
If the principal had received this information from sources other 
than the police, he then would be under a duty both to conduct a 
search and notify the police of his discoveries. We find no difference 
here where the information was merely relayed to the principal by 
the chief of police.50 
Discussion 
The court in McKinnon. just as the Supreme Court would later be in 
T.L.O.. was not compelled to rule on the exclusionary rule because the 
court found that the search was reasonable. The court, however, was split 
in its decision and the dissenting opinion pointed out that only seven 
minutes passed from the time the police called the principal, the search 
4eState v. McKinnon, 558 P. 2d 781, 784 (1977). 
47People v. Scott D., 315 N.E. 2d 466 (1974). 
48State v. McKinnon, 558 P. 2d 781, 784 (1977). 
49Ibid., p. 785. 
50Ibid. 
92 
was made, and police were summoned to make an arrest. This, the 
dissenting justices reasoned, strongly inferred . . that the school official 
acted in conjunction with and as an agent of the police."51 The fruits of the 
search were also used for criminal prosecution and not as a basis for 
disciplinary at school.52 Nevertheless, it was the seriousness of the 
situation and the exigency to conduct the search without delay, that 
provided the majority to view the search as legal and justified. 
Doe v. Renfrow 
475 F. Supp. 1012 (1979) 
Facts 
On March 23,1979, six units of drug detecting dogs were introduced 
to the campuses of Highland Junior and Senior High Schools in Highland, 
Indiana. The dogs, specially trained to alert to the smell of drugs, were 
requested by the Highland Town School District Board. Concern had 
mounted over the past several months as incidents of drug use continued to 
mount at both schools. Classroom disruptions was on the rise while school 
morale was declining.53 
A plan was devised which included the joint operation of school 
administrators, police and dog trainers. On the morning of the search, 
teachers were given sealed envelopes to be opened after first morning class 
siibid: 
52Ibid., p. 786. 
53Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012,1015 (1979). 
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began. The instructions were to keep all students in class until the "canine 
teams" could complete their search of the school. A team consisted of one 
dog handler, a teacher or administrator, and a uniformed police officer. 
The dogs were led into the classrooms and allowed to walk up and down the 
aisles of desks. When a dog alerted to a student, the student was required to 
empty his pockets.54 
The dogs alerted approximately fifty times during the two and one 
half hour search. If the dog continued to alert after the pocket search 
proved fruitless, the student was taken from the room and strip searched. 
Thirteen-year-old Diane Doe was one of eleven students taken from the 
classroom. She was led to the school nurse's station where she was met by 
two women, one a friend of Doe's mother. Doe, when questioned about 
using marijuana, denied any involvement. She was then asked to remove 
her clothes. A brief inspection of her body, which included lifting her hair 
to see if substances were hidden there, was conducted. No drugs were 
found and Doe was permitted to return to her class.55 
Drugs were found on seventeen other students. Disciplinary action 
was limited to the school and all seventeen were either expelled or allowed 
to withdraw voluntarily. Two other students were suspended because they 
had drug paraphernalia in their possession.56 Diane Doe, however, filed 
suit against the school, the police, and the dog handler, on grounds that her 
constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment had been violated by the 
54Ibid., pp. 1015-1016. 
55Ibid„ pp. 1016-1017. 
56Ibid., p. 1017. 
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search. The court, on hearing Doe's appeal, sought to answer questions 
basic to the search.57 
This Court is specifically confronted with the following issues: (1) 
whether the investigative procedure used by the school officials with 
the assistance of law enforcement officers, for the sole and exclusive 
purpose of furthering a valid educational goal of eliminating drug 
use within the school, was a seizure and search under the Fourth 
Amendment; (2) whether the use of dogs to detect marijuana and 
marijuana paraphernalia in the classroom was, standing alone, a 
search under the Fourth Amendment; (3) whether the admitted 
search of a student's clothing upon the continued alert of a trained 
drug detecting canine was violative of rights protected by the Fourth 
Amendment; and (4) whether the nude body search conducted solely 
upon the basis of a trained drug detecting canine's alert violated the 
plaintiff s right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure.58 
Decision 
The court first looked at the pocket search. Because school officials 
specifically requested that no criminal prosecutions be initiated, the search 
for drugs was viewed as an attempt to remove a serious threat from the 
school's environment. Reasoning that the school has a legitimate interest 
in eliminating drug use on campus, the court found this aspect of the 
search reasonable both and justified. The court, however, cautioned that 
had the police involvement been different, and drugs were being searched 
for to be used in criminal prosecutions, then the higher standard of 
"probable cause" would be required.59 
The court next turned to the use of the dogs and found that the alert 
was reasonable cause to believe that Diane Doe had marijuana in her 
5?Ibid., p. 1018. 
58Ibid. 
59Ibid., p. 1024. 
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possession. With that belief, the defendants in this case did not violate 
Diane's Fourth Amendment rights by requiring her to empty her pockets.60 
Finally, the court turned to the strip search. Here the court found 
that a nude search of a student based solely on the alert of a "trained drug-
detecting canine" was unreasonable.61 Judge Allan Sharp writing for the 
court stated: 
Subjecting a student to a nude search is more than just the mild 
inconvenience of a pocket search, rather, it is an intrusion into an 
individual's basic justifiable expectation of privacy. Before such a 
search can be performed, the school administrators must articulate 
some facts that provide a reasonable cause to believe the student 
possesses the contraband sought. The continued alert by the trained 
canine alone is insufficient to justify such a search because the 
animal reacts only to the scent or odor of the marijuana plant, not the 
substance itself. There is always the possibility that one's clothing 
may have been inadvertently exposed to the pungent odor of the 
drug.62 
On May 26, 1981 the United States Supreme Court denied a petition 
for a writ of certiorari. Justice William Brennan, Jr., dissented and in so 
doing provided a preview of what would later become a footnote in T.L.O. 
Specifically, Brennan believed the Court should review the case because of 
the "warrantless, student-by-student dragnet inspection" performed by 
"police-trained German shepherds."63 
Discussion 
This case involves much more than determining the legality and 
advisability of using trained drug-detecting canines. Once again the court 
60Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
62Ibid. 
63Doe v. Renfrow, 101 S. Ct. 3015, 3016 (1981). 
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had to inspect the degree of police involvement and look at factors justifying 
reasonable search. The court did imply that an intrusive strip search 
might be justified if there existed a preponderance of articulable facts.64 
The merit of this can be readily seen in the search of Diane Doe. On the 
morning of the search, Diane had played with her family dog which was in 
heat. The alert dog, it was later reasoned, alerted to Diane's dog, not to 
drugs.65 
Stern v. New Haven Community Schools 
529 F. Supp. 31 (1981) 
Facts 
On November 15, 1979, David Stern, a tenth-grade student at New 
Haven High School, in New Haven, Michigan, was observed through a two-
way mirror in a boys' restroom, purchasing marijuana from a fellow 
student. The observation was made by Brett Harris, an employee of the 
school. Harris reported the incident to Joe Barnette, principal, who then 
summoned Stern. Barnette advised Stern that if he cooperated fully and 
turned over the marijuana, the police would not be called. Stern cooperated 
and gave Barnette the marijuana. When the second student proved less 
cooperative, Barnette notified the police.66 
Stern brought suit against the school system alleging that his 
constitutional rights had been violated. Stern further alleged the two-way 
64Doe v. Renfrow, 475 F. Supp. 1012,1024 (1979). 
65Ibid., p. 1017. 
66Stern v. New Haven Community Schools, 529 F. Supp. 31, 33 (1981). 
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mirror was an "invasion of privacy" causing intentional emotional stress 
and the principal's call to police was a "breach" of his promise.67 
Decision 
The court categorically denied all motions and allegations and 
turned full attention to one remaining issue. Did plaintiff Stern, ". . . have 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched, the boys' 
restroom. ..." The court in answering this question about Stern, sought to 
balance the school's interest to search against Stern's interest to protect his 
privacy.6® The court stated: 
The Court is of the opinion that defendants' limited view of the boys' 
restroom through a two-way mirror neither invaded nor violated any 
of plaintiff minor's federally secured rights under the Fourth 
Amendment.69 
The court further noted that surveillance was done exclusively with 
school personnel and not police authorities. Furthermore, despite 
notification of police by the principal, no criminal charges were filed, and 
only school disciplinary action was taken against Stern. The court viewed 
all facts in relation to the school's compelling duty to maintain discipline 
and to foster a good educational environment.70 
Discussion 
This case is reviewed because of the unique procedure used by school 
officials to gain knowledge of student behavior. The court did not find use of 
67Ibid., p. 31. 
68Ibid., p. 36. 
69Ibid. 
70Ibid., pp. 36-37. 
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a two-way mirror to be a serious infringement on student rights. The court 
made clear the mirror provided only a limited restroom view. Although 
two-way mirrors were not a factor in T.L.O. the Supreme Court did discuss 
them during arguments. At one point Justice John Paul Stevens asked 
Deputy Attorney General, Allan J. Nodes, the lawyer arguing for the State 
of New Jersey, "Is there no expectation of privacy in a restroom?" The reply 
was, "Not from two-way mirrors placed over the sinks."71 
Bilbrev v. Brown 
738 F. 2d 1462 (1984) 
Facts 
On September 8,1978, Roberta Cunningham, a school bus driver for 
the Columbia County School Board, observed two fifth grade boys, Anthony 
Gartner and Joseph Bilbrey, exchange something on the playground. 
Cunningham suspected drugs but was unable to specifically identify what 
had been exchanged. She reported her suspicions to the principal, Joseph 
Taylor. Taylor than directed Gary Robinson, a teacher, to take the boys to a 
school locker room. After informing Bilbrey that they were going to search 
him for drugs, Robinson performed a pat-down search which failed to 
produce any contraband. Taylor then directed Bilbrey to strip to his 
71 David O. Stewart, "And in Her Purse the Principal Found 
Marijuana," American Bar Association Journal. 71, (February, 1985), p. 
53. 
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underwear. An inspection of the removed clothes likewise provided no 
drugs or evidence of wrongdoing.72 
Bilbrey and Gartner brought suit against the members of the 
Columbia County School Board, the superintendent, the principal, two 
teachers, and the school bus driver, alleging that their constitutional rights 
had been violated by an illegal search.73 The United States District Court 
for the District of Oregon found that constitutional rights had been violated 
but school personnel were entitled to immunity and were not subject to any 
pecuniary liability. Bilbrey and Gartner appealed to the United States Court 
of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.74 
Decision 
The Ninth Circuit confirmed the lower court's ruling in regards to 
the violation of constitutional rights but reversed the court's decision on 
granting immunity. Several factors influenced the court in making this 
decision. First, the Board of Education's own policy established clear 
guidelines for school authorities to follow when conducting a student 
search. Second, the guidelines should have been known by the principal 
and teacher. Third, the guidelines were not followed.75 
The court further recognized the established tenet that as the 
intrusiveness of the search increases the standard for establishing 
72Bilbrey v. Brown, 738 F. 2d 1462,1464 (19th Cir. 984). 
73Ibid. 
74Ibid., p. 1462. 
75Ibid., pp. 1465-1466. 
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justification approaches probable cause.76 A dissenting opinion, however, 
believed the lower court erred in its pronouncement that the law was settled 
on the issue of applying the Fourth Amendment to school searches. The 
dissent pointed out that neither the Ninth Circuit nor the United States 
Supreme Court had addressed the issue.77 There were also extenuating 
circumstances that increased the likelihood that Bilbrey and Gartner may 
have been in possession of drugs. Gartner's older brother, for example, on 
an earlier occasion was reported to have offered marijuana to the bus 
driver. There was also a reported concern that a growing drug problem at 
the high school might spill over to the elementary school. Furthermore, 
Bilbrey had been observed on another occasion hiding a paper bag which he 
exchanged with Gartner for money. These facts, the dissent stated, were 
sufficient to grant immunity to the defendants.78 
Discussion 
Here the court was presented with mere suspicious behavior, which 
was not sufficiently supported by articulable facts, as grounds to strip 
search a fifth grade boy. The courts rejected the search and declared it 
illegal. Those involved were not granted immunity because of "good faith" 
involvement, but rather were remanded to face monetary penalties 
determined by a jury. The dissenting judge pointed out that T.L.O. had 
7bIbid., p. 1467. 
77Ibid., p. 1472. 
78Ibid., pp. 1472-1473. 
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been granted certiorari by the Supreme Court, confirming his opinion that 
constitutional law remains unsettled on school searches.79 
NEW JERSEY V. T.L.O. 
Overview 
The Supreme Court in New Jersey v. T.L.O. granted certiorari for the 
first time to a school related search and seizure. The Court, originally 
asked to review issues related to the "exclusionary rule," chose instead to 
have attorneys argue the more basic issues concerning the proper standard 
to be applied to school personnel during a search of a student or his 
property. This case is truly a landmark decision in education. It 
established that school personnel will not be held to the same standard as 
law enforcement authorities, yet proclaimed that in loco parentis was in 
"teiision" with the basic beliefs of the Court. While certain questions were 
being answered, others were left unanswered. T.L.O. will doubtfully be the 
last word on search and seizure from the nation's highest court. 
New Jersey v. T.L.O. 
105 S. Ct. 733 (1985) 
Facts 
On March 7, 1980 at Piscataway High School in Middlesex County, 
New Jersey, Assistant Principal Theodore Choplick received a teacher's 
report that student Terry Lee Owens and a companion were smoking in a 
79Ibid., p. 1473. 
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girls' restroom. Owens, a fourteen year old freshman, denied that she was 
smoking. Whereupon Choplick demanded her purse and opened it for 
inspection. Immediately visible was a pack of cigarettes which Choplick 
seized, exposing a pack of cigarette rolling papers. Choplick, relying on his 
knowledge of cigarette rolling papers and their association with marijuana 
use, continued his search. Found was a small amount of marijuana, a 
pipe, empty plastic bags of the type used to carry marijuana, a substantial 
amount of money in one dollar bills, a list of names, and two personal 
letters which implicated Owens in drug use.80 
Choplick informed both police and Owens' mother of the incident. 
Charges were filed and she was brought before the Juvenile and Domestic 
Relations Court of Middlesex County on delinquency charges. Despite a 
confession to the police, Owens sought to have the evidence seized by 
Choplick excluded from the hearing based on her assertion that her 
constitutional rights had been violated. The court denied the motion to 
suppress the evidence and instead placed Owens on one year's probation. 
The court reasoned that the search for cigarettes was justified based on the 
school rule infraction. Justification for the second search for drugs was 
based on the plain view doctrine.81 
Owens appealed but the appellate court concurred that there had 
been no Fourth Amendment violation. Owens continued her appeal to the 
New Jersey Supreme Court which reversed the earlier appellate decision 
a n d  g r a n t e d  t h e  r e q u e s t  t o  s u p p r e s s  t h e  e v i d e n c e .  T h e  c o u r t  s t a t e d  t h a t " . . .  
suNew Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 734 (1985). 
81Ibid., p. 737. 
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if an official search violates constitutional rights, the evidence is not 
admissible in criminal proceedings." The court based its finding on four 
observations: (1) the possession of cigarettes was not a violation of school 
rules at Piscataway High School, (2) the possession of cigarettes is not 
conclusive evidence that the person is a smoker, (3) the Assistant Principal 
had received no information that cigarettes might be in the purse, (4) and 
finally, even after drugs were found, the continued intrusion into personal 
letters was unreasonable.82 
The State, on behalf of Choplick, appealed to the United States 
Supreme Court. The Court initially granted certiorari to examine the 
appropriateness of the exclusionary rule but decided instead to have 
attorneys reargue the case based on . . the broader question of what 
limits, if any, the Fourth Amendment places on the activities of school 
authorities. . . ."83 
Decision 
The Court held that the Fourth Amendment does prohibit 
unreasonable searches by school officials and school personnel cannot find 
protection in the doctrine of in loco parentis. Because school personnel are 
representatives of the state and paid by the state, they cannot claim 
immunity from Fourth Amendment strictures based on a surrogate parent 
relationship.84 
B2Ibid., pp. 737-738. 
83Ibid., p. 738. 
84Ibid., p. 741. 
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The Court further stated that while students have a legitimate 
expectation of privacy, the necessity to obtain a warrant based on probable 
cause would not be required of school personnel. The school setting, with 
its need to maintain swift and informal disciplinary procedures, requires 
. . some easing of the restrictions to which searches by public authorities 
are ordinarily subject."85 
The legality of a search, the Court reasoned, must be reasonable in 
all circumstances related to the case. To determine reasonableness the 
Court adopted a twofold inquiry. Based on the Court's Terrv86 decision, the 
first question was: "Was the search justified at its inception?" The second 
question was: "Was the search reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances which originally justified the search?"87 
The Court reasoned that in this case two separate searches had taken 
place. The first for cigarettes, the second for drugs. The validity of the 
second search depended on the justification and validity of the first. The 
Supreme Court took exception to the Supreme Court of New Jersey's 
somewhat "crabbed" view of the circumstances and found to the contrary 
that the search for cigarettes was just a "common-sense conclusion." The 
discovery of rolling papers thus was sufficient to justify the continued 
search for marijuana. The discovery of a list of names, in turn, justified 
the examination of personal letters. "In short," the Court stated, "we 
a5Ibid., p. 743. 
86Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
87New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 744 (1985). 
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cannot conclude that the search for marijuana was unreasonable in any 
respect."88 
Justice Byron White wrote the opinion for the majority with Justices 
Lewis Powell, Jr., Sandra Day O'Connor, and Harry Blackmun 
concurring. O'Connor and Powell joined to write a concurring opinion as 
did Blackmun. Justices William Brennan, Jr., Thurgood Marshall, and 
John Paul Stevens dissented. Brennan and Marshall joined to write: 
In adopting the unclear, unprecedented, and unnecessary departure 
from generally applicable Fourth Amendment standards, the Court 
carves out a broad exception to standards that this Court has 
developed over years of considering Fourth Amendment problems89 
Both Brennan and Marshall further believed the search of Owens' 
purse to be unjustified and the balancing test used by the Court to be flawed. 
Both agreed that the new test to determine reasonableness would only serve 
to further confuse teachers leaving them ". . . hopelessly adrift as to when a 
search may be permissible."90 Justice Stevens' dissent focused on the 
likelihood that the new standard would permit school personnel to search 
students "... suspected of violating only the most trivial school regulations 
and guidelines for behavior."91 Stevens further echoed the fear that school 
"8^Ibid., pp. 745-746. 
89Ibid., p. 750. 
90Ibid., p. 752 and p. 754. 
91Ibid., p. 759. 
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children would receive a negative lesson on fairness and on the concept of 
"liberty and justice for all."92 
Discussion 
This landmark decision established that school personnel are not 
held to the same standard as other government agents when conducting 
searches that are justified at their inception and reasonably related in scope 
to the justification. While the Court was specific about its standard of 
reasonableness, no mention was made concerning the search of lockers 
and automobiles;the use of sniff-dogs; the allowable degree of police 
involvement; nor the exclusionary rule. And despite the establishment of a 
twofold inquiry, the simple fact remains that justification to search is 
contingent on human interpretation of facts. It is apparent in this 4:3 
decision that facts preceding a search can be viewed significantly different 
from one person to another. 
SEARCHES POST-T.L.O. 
Overview 
All of the searches reviewed here actually occurred prior to the 
Supreme Court's ruling in T.L.O. Therefore school officials could not 
benefit from the Court's decision. Lower courts, of course, have benefited 
and virtually all decisions have been analyzed with the T.L.O. decision as a 
basis for review. 
92Ibid., p. 761. 
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Martens v. District No. 220. Bd. of Educ. 
620 F. Supp. 29 (1985) 
Fasts 
On April 29,1982, Joan Baukus, the Dean of Students at Reavis High 
School in Stickney, Ohio, received an anonymous tip from an adult female 
that Michael Martens, a student at Reavis, was selling drugs at school. 
The caller gave specific details about what Martens' activities and where he 
secreted drugs and related paraphernalia. Baukus had received a similar 
tip the same day from a person she believed was the same caller. As a 
result of this earlier tip, Baukus had discovered marijuana in another 
student's locker.93 
Baukus called Martens to her office. Martens denied that he had any 
drugs on his person but refused to empty his pockets. Unable to reach 
Martens' parents, Baukus allowed a sheriffs deputy, who just happened to 
be at the school, to talk with Martens. The deputy suggested to Martens 
that he comply with the dean's request. Martens emptied his pockets 
revealing a pipe tested to have marijuana residue.94 
Martens was suspended from school by the administration and was 
eventually expelled by the Board of Education, District No. 220. Martens 
brought suit based on an alleged violation of his Fourth Amendment rights 
93Martens v. District No. 220, Bd. of Educ., 620 F. Supp. 29, 30 (1985). 
94Ibid., pp. 30-31. 
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and on the introduction of illegally seized evidence at his expulsion 
hearing.95 
Decision 
The court initially delayed its decision pending the outcome of the 
Supreme Court's T.L.O. decision. Immediately thereafter the court 
applied for the first time the twofold inquiry recommended by the 
Supreme Court in T.L.O. The search of Martens was justified at its 
inception because of the anonymous telephone call. Furthermore the 
emptying of pockets was well within a reasonable scope based on the 
collective facts of the case.96 
Discussion 
One factor takes this case beyond principles established by T.L.O. 
Police were directly involved in the search of Martens. The court, however, 
satisfied itself that police involvement was quite minimal and since 
criminal proceedings were initiated, there was no requirement to establish 
probable cause. Of interest also is the court's analysis of factors giving 
credence to "reasonableness." First, the school was experiencing a 
significant drug problem. Second, the anonymous tip came from "a 
member of the public" which the court believed added to its credibility. 
Third, the tip was similar to the earlier tip which proved accurate. And 
95Ibid. 
96Ibid., p. 32. 
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finally, the tip was not a "blanket" allegation but rather spelled out in detail 
what Martens was doing.97 
In re Bobbv B. 
218 Cal. Rptr. 253 (1985) 
Facts 
On October 21, 1984, Mr. Carlos Martinez, Dean of Boys at Lincoln 
High School in Los Angeles, was inspecting restrooms while students were 
in class. Bobby Ramon and another boy were found in a restroom without a 
pass. According to Martinez, Ramon acted in a suspicious manner which 
prompted the Dean to require the boy to empty his pockets to look for "pot." 
Discovered were two marijuana cigarettes and about a gram of cocaine. All 
items were located inside of Ramon's wallet which Martinez searched. 
Bobby Ramon brought suit to have the evidence discovered by Martinez 
suppressed.98 
Decision 
Both appellant and respondent referred to the T.L.O. decision in their 
arguments. The court applied the "two-prong"99 test of T.L.O. and found 
the search to be legal. Justification at the inception was based on 
Martinez's testimony that a significant drug problem existed at Lincoln 
STIbld: 
98In re Bobby B., 218 Cal. Rptr. 253, 254 (1985). 
"The court substituted two-pronged for twofold used by T.L.O. The 
"two-pronged" test was used in In re W. 29 Cal. App. 3d 777,105 Cal. Rptr. 
775 (1973). 
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High, especially in the restrooms. Prevalent problem, student out of class 
unauthorized and nervous behavior combined to justify the search. In 
applying the "second-prong" the court reasoned that a pocket search, even 
into the appellant's wallet, was based on reasonable suspicion. The court 
closed by stating: "Such search was mandated by necessity, reasonable in 
scope and judicially approved."100 
Discussion 
It is interesting to note the contrast of In re Bobbv B. to T.L.O. 
Although Bobby Ramon was in a restroom without permission, he was not 
smoking. There was no smell of marijuana smoke, he was not observed 
passing anything to the Other student. In fact, there was no information at 
all tw suggest that Martinez even knew Ramon or suspected him of being 
involved with drugs. Without individualized suspicion, this case appears to 
give validity to Justice Stevens' fear that intrusive searches would be 
instigated for relatively minor offenses. In this case, the only rule broken 
was to be in the restroom without a pass. 
State v. Joseph T. 
336 S.E. 2d 728 (1985) 
Facts 
On March 11, 1982, Joseph Martray, an assistant principal at 
Follansbee Middle School in Brooke County, West Virginia, detected the 
smell of alcohol on a student's breath. When confronted, the student 
i°°In re Bobby B., 218 Cal. Rptr. 253, 254, 255, 256 (1985). 
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confessed that he had consumed a beer that morning before coming to 
school at the home of Joseph T. The assistant principal asked two teachers 
to search the latter student's locker using the school's dual control key. 
Found in a jacket located in the locker were pipes, cigarette rolling papers, 
and a plastic box containing marijuana cigarettes. All items were left in 
the jacket and findings were reported to Martray. The assistant principal 
summoned Joseph and returned with him to the locker, reopened it, and 
examined the contents. Joseph, referred to the juvenile authorities, sought 
to suppress the evidence. The circuit court denied the motion and placed 
the defendant on probation.101 
Decision 
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia in a 2:1 decision 
upheld the lower court's findings based on the Supreme Court's ruling in 
T.L.O. The court did note that two issues, relevant to their case, were not 
addressed in the Supreme Court's decision. These included search of 
school lockers by school authorities and the question concerning exclusion 
of evidence from subsequent criminal proceedings if a search was found to 
be unreasonable.102 
The court relied heavily on several pre-T.L.Q. locker search cases in 
forming its opinion. The two-pronged test of In re W.103 was formulated by 
a court faced with a situation quite similar to the facts surrounding the 
101 State v. Joseph T., 336 S.E. 2d 728, 730, 731 (1985). 
102Ibid., p. 733. 
i03in re W., 29 Cal. App. 3d 777,105 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1973). 
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search of Joseph T. Marijuana discovered by an assistant principal in a 
dual controlled locker, was returned to the locker until the student could be 
brought to the locker. The locker was then opened in the student's 
presence. The court developed the two-pronged test asking first, was the 
search within the scope of the school's duties and second, was the search 
reasonable under all facts and circumstances.104 
The other cases relied on by the court were In re Donaldson.105 
Horton.106 and T.L.O. The court applied the twofold inquiry of T.L.O. and 
found the search of Joseph T. to be legal in both circumstances.107 
Reviewing the assistant principal's suspicion about the appellant having 
alcohol in his locker the court wrote: 
Although Martray's suspicion, that the appellant may have brought 
alcoholic beverages to the school, may not have reached the level of 
"probable cause," we are of the opinion that Martray instituted the 
search of the appellant's locker under circumstances consistent with 
the "reasonable suspicion standard . . . ."108 
A dissenting opinion in this case believed the search of the locker to 
be improper because of the absence of "articulable facts" to suspect that 
alcohol would be found in the locker. The fact that the appellant's friend 
had consumed a beer at the appellant's home, was insufficient to justify a 
104State v. Joseph T., 336 S.E. 2d 728, 733 (1985). 
i05in re Donaldson, 269 Cal. App. 2d 509, 75 Cal. Rptr. 220 (1969). 
106Horton v. Goose Creek Independent School District, 690 F. 2d 470, 
reh'a denied. 693 F. 2d 524 (1982), cert, denied, 463 U.S. 1207,103 S. Ct. 3536 
(1983). 
i°7State v. Joseph T., 336 S.E. 2d 728, 732 (1985). 
108Ibid., p. 737. 
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search of his school locker. Furthermore, the dissent questioned the scope 
of the search. If indeed the search was to look for alcohol, then a mere pat-
down of the jacket, found in the locker, would have been sufficient to 
determine if alcohol was present. The school personnel went much farther 
and searched the jacket in detail.109 
Discussion 
Once again justices argue a search case using the the twofold inquiry 
advanced by T.L.O. This case involved the search of a student's locker. 
Even though T.L.O. did not address the issue of locker search, it is hard to 
imagine that a more rigid standard might be expected for a dual controlled 
storage site as opposed to something so personal as a female's purse. The 
court's majority chose to apply a somewhat relaxed inspection of the 
relationship of alcohol on a friend's breath to a suspicion that alcoholic 
beverages would be found in the locker. The minority opinion saw a 
significant absence of a nexus between the facts and the resulting 
suspicion. 
Again the element of human judgment, based on the weighing of 
personal values and on the individual justices interpretation of prior cases 
and issues, has led to a split decision. In this case, the majority found the 
search to be reasonable. The appellant's attempt to suppress as evidence 
the marijuana and paraphernalia was denied based on the fact that the 
search was ruled as justified and reasonable.110 
109Ibid., p. 741. 
110Ibid., p. 738. 
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In re William G. 
709 P. 2d 1287 (1985) 
Easts 
On October 1,1979, William G., a student at Chatsworth High School 
in Los Angeles, was walking with two male companions across the school's 
campus. Assistant Principal, Reno Lorenz, observed the boys from a 
distance of approximately thirty-five yards. He noticed that William was 
carrying a small black case which was drawing the attention of his 
companions. The case had an unusual bulge.111 
Lorenz pursued the students and upon reaching them asked where 
they were going and why they were not in class. William, an early release 
student, advised the administrator that his classes had ended for the day. 
In the course of the conversation, Lorenz observed William "palm" the case 
to his side and then behind his back. The administrator asked William 
what he was hiding to which the student replied, "Nothing."112 
Lorenz then attempted to see what William was concealing behind 
his back. The student protested, "You can't search me," and then, "You 
need a warrant for this." William was then escorted to the school's office by 
Lorenz where the case was forcibly taken. Inside was discovered 
marijuana, a gram weight scale and cigarette rolling papers. William 
stated that the contents belonged to someone else.113 
iiiln re William G., 221 Cal. Rptr. 118, 709 P. 2d 1287,1289 (1985). 
112Ibid. 
iiSlbid. 
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The Los Angeles police were summoned and arrested William. In a 
police pat-down search of the student, $135 was found in the boy's pockets, 
but was never introduced into evidence. Immediately William protested 
that evidence seized by Lorenz should not be used against him. The 
immediate search, he maintained, was without a reasonable basis.114 
Lorenz, who admitted in the ajudication hearing that he often helped 
police in "arresting" juveniles for drug violations, stated that he had no 
prior knowledge of William and was moved to action only on his established 
procedure to check students who were out of class. The court denied the 
request to suppress evidence finding instead that the search was conducted 
on reasonable grounds. William appealed.115 
Decision 
In another divided opinion, the Supreme Court of California reversed 
the Los Angeles County Superior Court's ruling and declared that the 
evidence found on William should be excluded from evidence being 
introduced against him. The decision focused on the determination of 
"reasonable suspicion." The court recognized that a majority of courts, in 
other jurisdictions, had adopted standards below that of "probable cause." 
Reasonable suspicion was not without its own restriction to be based on 
objective and articulable facts.116 
114Ibid. 
115Ibid., pp. 1289-1290. 
116Ibid., pp. 1297-1298. 
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The court reviewed in detail the events leading up to the search of 
William and found that: 
Lorenz articulated no facts to support a reasonable suspicion that 
William was engaged in a proscribed activity justifying a search. 
The record reflects a complete lack of anv prior knowledge or 
information on the part of Lorenz relating William to the possession, 
use, or sale, of illegal drugs or other contraband .... Lorenz' 
suspicion that William was tardy or truant from class provided no 
reasonable basis for conducting a search of any kind. The record is 
also devoid of evidence of exigent circumstances requiring an 
immediate nonconsensual search.117 
The court further held that neither the "furtive" effort to conceal the 
calculator case from view, nor the student's protest that Lorenz could not 
search him without a "warrant," were facts that would contribute to 
"reasonable suspicion." Many reasons might exist, other than the desire to 
conceal evidence, that would cause a person to demand respect for his or 
her constitutional rights.118 The court stated: 
If a student's limited right of privacy is to have any meaning, his 
attempt to exercise that right-by shielding a private possession from 
a school official's view—cannot in itself trigger a "reasonable 
suspicion." A contrary conclusion would lead to the anomalous 
result that a student would retain a right of privacy only in those 
matters that he willingly reveals to school officials.119 
Discussion 
It is interesting to compare the circumstances in William G. to those 
in Bobbv B.120 In both cases, suspicion was initiated by the student's 
presence in an area where they were not supposed to be. In Bobbv B.. the 
11YIbid., p. 1297. 
"Slbid. 
119Ibid., pp. 1297-1298. 
120In re Bobby B., 218 Cal. Rptr. 253 (1985). 
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court found that suspicious behavior was sufficient to perform a reasonable 
search, yet in William G.. the actual sighting of a calculator case with an 
unusual bulge, coupled with other overt behaviors, was not considered 
sufficient. The Justices of the Supreme Court of California also split in 
their decision. The Chief Justice dissented because of the court's 
reasoning. He preferred instead the adoption of the "probable cause" 
standard advocated by United States Supreme Court Justice Brennan.121 
Other dissent focused on the opposite extreme and protested that the 
circumstances presented in William were sufficient to justify the search at 
its inception and maintain its reasonableness in scope to the factors 
justifying the search in the first place. 
Cales v. Howell Public Schools 
635 F. Supp. 454 (1985) 
Facts 
On April 30, 1980, Ruth Cales, a fifteen year old tenth grader at 
Howell High School in Howell, Michigan, was observed by the school's 
security guard in the student parking lot. The guard's attention was 
drawn to the student because she was acting in a suspicious manner and 
was ducking down behind cars. When confronted, Cales gave the security 
guard a fake name. Cales was taken to the office of Daniel McCarthy, 
assistant principal. There McCarthy ordered Cales to empty the contents of 
121Ibid., pp. 1298-1300. 
118 
her purse on his desk. Confiscated were some readmittance slips which 
were improperly in her possession.122 
McCarthy, suspecting that Cales might be in possession of drugs, 
ordered that she turn her pockets inside-out. When nothing illegal was 
found, McCarthy ordered Assistant Principal Mary Steinhelper, to search 
Cales further. Steinhelper had the tenth grader remove her jeans and 
inspected her even so far as to require that she bend over in order to ". . . 
examine the contents of her brassiere." Although McCarthy was not 
present for the strip search, it was witnessed by Colleen Wise, McCarthy's 
secretary.123 
Alleging that her civil rights had been violated, Cales brought suit 
against the Howell Public Schools, McCarthy, Steinhelper and Wise. The 
court in making its decision asked the following questions. Did the school 
district have a policy or custom concerning strip search of students? Did 
the assistant principal have reasonable suspicion that a search would turn 
up evidence of drugs or other contraband? Is an assistant principal entitled 
to qualified immunity for ordering a student's strip search or for 
conducting one? Finally, can a secretary be liable for merely watching an 
action that was ordered by her superior.124 
122Cales v. Howell Public Schools, 635 F. Supp. 454 (1985). 
123Ibid., p. 455. 
124Ibid., pp. 454-455. 
119 
Decision 
The court ruled that the Howell Public Schools could not be held liable 
for the search. No evidence was brought forth that a board of education 
policy existed which would, or did, contribute to the alleged violation of 
Cales' constitutional rights. The court further held that McCarthy, as well 
as Steinhelper, could be held liable if the search was ruled unreasonable. 
The test to be applied was that expressed in T.L.O. Was the search justified 
at its inception and was the search as conducted reasonably related in scope 
to the facts that justified the search in the first place.125 
The court applied the facts to the first test. Cales was observed 
ducking behind cars, gave a false name, and was cutting class. The court 
stated that: 
It is clear that plaintiffs conduct created reasonable grounds for 
suspecting that some school rule or law had been violated. However, 
it does not create a reasonable suspicion that a search would turn up 
evidence of drug usage. Plaintiffs conduct was clearly ambiguous. 
It could have indicated that she was truant, or that she was stealing 
hubcaps, or that she had left class to meet a boy friend.126 
Cales' various behaviors, the court stated, were such as to indicate a 
violation of any number of rules or regulations. The court, however, was 
not going to apply the Supreme Court's decision in T.L.O. in a manner that 
would allow searches to be based on ambiguous behaviors. The court wrote: 
This Court does not read T.L.O. so broadly as to allow a school 
administrator the right to search a student because that student acts 
in such a way so as to create a reasonable suspicion that the student 
has violated some rule or law. Rather, the burden is on the 
administrator to establish that the student's conduct is such that it 
i^Ibid., pp. 456-457. 
126Ibid., p. 457. 
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creates a reasonable suspicion that a specific rule or law has been 
violated and that a search could reasonably be expected to produce 
evidence of that violation. If the administrator fails to carry this 
burden, any subsequent search necessarily falls beyond the 
parameters of the Fourth Amendment. Because the facts here 
establish that the search was not reasonable at its inception, it is 
unnecessary to address the second prong of the TLO test.127 
The court next turned its attention to the qualified immunity of 
McCarthy, Steinhelper, and Wise. McCarthy, the court reasoned, was not 
entitled to qualified immunity. The testimony indicated that McCarthy was 
aware that a search by a school administrator must be based on reasonable 
suspicion. Since the court concluded that reasonable suspicion was not 
present, the actions of McCarthy were illegal.128 
The court found that Steinhelper's involvement was specifically 
related to the directions given to her by McCarthy. Since Steinhelper was 
unaware of the facts leading up to Cales being brought to McCarthy's office, 
she acted only upon the directions of McCarthy to search the tenth grader. 
Therefore, the court reasoned, her search was reasonably related to the 
objectives of the search-namely drugs that McCarthy suspected. Wise was 
also granted immunity based on the court's belief that to merely witness an 
unconstitutional action at the direction of a superior, was not in itself an 
illegal act.129 
128lbid., p. 458. 
129Ibid. 
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Discussion 
The court made it clear at the onset that both parties were to argue 
the case based on the Supreme Court's T.L.O. decision.130 It is interesting 
to note that the court's review of the facts, prompting McCarthy to search 
Cales, led them to the conclusion that the search was unreasonable and 
therefore unjustified. The second inquiry required by the T.L.O. test was 
therefore unnecessary. Yet, the court in considering the question of 
immunity for Steinhelper, found that McCarthy's suspicion, stated to 
Steinhelper that Cales may be carrying drugs, was sufficient to establish 
that the methods employed by Steinhelper were reasonably related to the 
objectives of the search.131 
This case is evidence that the fears expressed by Supreme Court 
Justice Stevens may be legitimate.132 Although the participants of this 
search could not have been influenced by T.L.O.. the court's decision 
helps to define how the standard of reasonableness will be applied.133 
Although it is likely that Justicev Stevens would have found insufficient 
cause to justify a reasonable search, it is not likely he would have found 
that a strip search was reasonably related to McCarthy's suspicion that 
Cales was carrying drugs. 
130Ibid., p. 450. 
131 Ibid., p. 458. 
132New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 759 (1985). 
133Both the search of Cales, as well as of Owens in T.L.O.. took place 
in the Spring of 1980. It was over four years after McCarthy had had Cales 
strip searched, that the Supreme Court handed down its decision on school 
related searches. 
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State v. Brooks 
718 P. 2d 837 (1986) 
Facts 
On October 19, 1983, Vicki Sherwood, Vice-Principal of Inglemoor 
High School in Seattle, Washington, received information that student Steve 
Brooks was selling marijuana out of his school locker. The informant, a 
fellow student whose locker was located close to Brooks' locker, advised 
Sherwood that he had observed Brooks selling out of a blue metal box.134 
Ms. Sherwood had on three other occasions received reports that 
Brooks was a drug user and had been observed under the influence of drugs 
at school. She had confronted him each time and had informed his mother 
of her suspicions. Brooks was also known to frequent an area, identified by 
Sherwood and others, to be a ". . . site of drug trafficking among 
students."135 
The assistant principal immediately informed the school's principal 
and together they searched locker 372-D, which was being used by Brooks. 
The blue metal box, found inside the locker, was also locked. Unable to 
open the box, they placed it back into the locker and sent for Brooks. The 
locker was again opened and the contents removed. Brooks refused to open 
the metal box until the principal advised him that the police would be 
called.136 
134State v. Brooks, 718 P. 2d 837 (1986). 
135Ibid. 
136Ibid., p. 838. 
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Brooks then consented to open the box which contained 
hallucinogenic mushrooms. The principal then called the police and 
Brooks was arrested. Brooks argued that his constitutional rights had been 
violated by an illegal search and sought to have the evidence excluded from 
his trial. The motion to suppress was denied and Brooks was found guilty 
of possession and intent to deliver psilocyn mushrooms.137 
Decision 
Immediately the court seized upon the twofold inquiry conveyed in 
T.L.O. The legality of a search is based upon the reasonableness of all 
circumstances related to it. The search must be reasonable at its inception 
and it must be reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that 
originally justified the search.138 
The court then proceeded to enumerate the justifying factors in 
Brooks. These included first an informant whose information proved 
accurate. Second, the belief by the assistant principal that Brooks was a 
drug user. Third, reports by three different teachers that Brooks had been 
previously observed in an intoxicated state. And finally, a knowledge that 
Brooks frequented a place notorious as a drug trafficking area.139 The court 
stated: 
On the basis of these facts, Sherwood and the school principal 
searched Brooks' locker and metal box. These searches were 
justified at their inception because there were reasonable grounds for 
the school officials to suspect that the search would turn up evidence 
VHWd. 
138New Jersey v. T.L.O., 105 S. Ct. 733, 739 (1985). 
139State v. Brooks, 718 P. 2d 837 (Wash. App. 1986). 
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that Brooks had violated or was violating either the law or the rules of 
the school. . . . The search was permissible in its scope because it 
was limited to the search of the locker and metal box whose 
purported contents justified the search at its inception.140 
Discussion 
It is apparent that the justices had little difficulty reaching their 
unanimous decision. The facts leading up to the search of Brooks' locker 
strongly suggest a likelihood (reasonable suspicion) that Brooks was 
involved in drugs and was dealing out of a box locked away in a school 
locker. There were no unusual bulges as in William G..141 or "funny" 
behavior as in Gales.142 The facts specifically relate and very little 
subjectivity is required to draw a conclusion. 
R.D.L. v. State 
499 So. 2d 31 (1986) 
Facts 
R.D.L., a student at Cobb Middle School in Pinellas County, Florida, 
was charged with grand theft based on evidence found in his school locker. 
He had been observed in the school's office where a clock was later reported 
as missing. He had also been seen with a pot of honey which was reported 
missing from the school's home economics department. Also missing was 
14UIbid., p. 839. 
141 In re William G., 709 P. 2d 1287 (Cal. 1985). 
142Cales v. Howell Public Schools, 635 F. Supp. 454 (ED. Mich. 1985). 
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over $3000 worth of school lunch tickets. When directed to open his locker 
by the school's assistant principal, the stolen tickets fell onto the floor.143 
Decision 
The District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District, affirmed the 
lower court's verdict of guilty. R.D.L.'s appeal was based on his assertion 
that the search was illegal therefore the evidence discovered in the search 
should be suppressed. The court applied the T.L.O. standards to measure 
the reasonableness of R.D.L.'s locker search. The decision was unanimous 
that the search was not only justified at its inception but also was 
reasonable in its scope.144 
Discussion 
This relatively insignificant case reinforces the fact that lower courts 
are relying upon the T.L.O. twofold inquiry. The circumstances again 
point to articulable facts that raise the level of suspicion specifically to the 
incident at hand. 
In Interest of Dumas 
515 A. 2d 984 (1986) 
Facts 
Guy Dumas, a student at Academy High School in Erie County, 
Pennsylvania, was observed by a teacher giving a cigarette to another 
student. He had taken the cigarette from a pack he had in his school 
143R.D.L. v. State, 499 So. 2d 31 (1986). 
144Ibid., pp. 31-32. 
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locker. The teacher reported the incident to an assistant principal who 
immediately confronted both boys, taking the cigarette from one and the 
pack of cigarettes from Dumas. The boy's locker was then searched. 
Inside of a jacket, found in the locker, another package of cigarettes was 
found which contained marijuana.145 
Charged on a delinquency petition to juvenile court. Dumas moved to 
suppress the evidence based on his contention that the search had been 
illegal. The motion to suppress was granted by the Court of Common Pleas, 
Juvenile Division. The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania appealed.146 
Decision 
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the lower court's 
decision to suppress the evidence. Noting that T.L.O. had been mute on 
searching lockers, the court still applied the twofold inquiry to the case.147 
In applying the first inquiry the court reasoned that the assistant principal 
was justified in believing that Dumas had violated school rules by 
possessing cigarettes. But it was here that reasonable suspicion ended, and 
the court agreed with the earlier decision. 
However, once he [the assistant principal] had seized the pack of 
cigarettes from Guy's hands, the court found that it was not 
reasonable to suspect that there would be more cigarettes in his 
locker. We agree. Further, although . . . [the assistant principal] . . . 
suspected Guy of being involved with marijuana he was unable to 
articulate any reasons for this suspecion. The mere fact that Guy 
145In Interest of Dumas, 515 A. 2d 984 (1986). 
146Ibid., pp. 984-985. 
147Ibid., p. 986. 
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possessed cigarettes does not lead to the conclusion that he would 
also possess marijuana.148 
Discussion 
The court again applied the T.L.O. twofold inquiry and found that 
justification was not present at the inception. A separate concurring 
opinion offers additional insight into the thinking of the court. First it was 
recognized that the school official "... did not have a reasonable and 
articulable basis to believe that the search would uncover evidence that the 
law or rules of the school were violated or being violated."149 But had the 
school communicated to the students that periodic inspections and 
searches could be made, then the student's expectation of privacy would be 
lessened. In this case the court found that: 
The record does not indicate that the school made any special 
restrictions with regard to the nature of the items which could be 
stored in the locker. The school did not notify students that use of the 
lockers would be subject to random or periodic inspection or 
search.150 
But had the school in Dumas  accomplished the above, then the 
student would not have had a reasonable expectation of privacy. As the 
concurring justice wrote: 
I find no constitutional entitlement to a private school locker. Hence, 
I would find no prohibition to prevent the adoption of reasonable 
restrictions on the use of school lockers.151 
14«Ibid. 
149Ibid. 
150Ibid. 
151 Ibid., p. 987. 
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Simply stated, the court believes that any school can make reasonable 
and lawful searches if it announces a dual control of lockers and advises 
students that periodic inspections and searches can be made. Failure to 
advise students increases the degree of privacy that must be afforded to 
students using school lockers.152 
SUMMARY 
The review and analysis of court cases related to search and seizure 
is essential to an understanding of the magnitude and dimension of the 
problem. The courts have relied on established precedent when possible 
and on their own judgment when it was not possible. The preceding eight 
pre-T.L.O. cases are, at best, representative of school search cases from 
1969 to 1985. The cases reviewed and analyzed in this study were selected 
for a peculiar contribution or because they but represented an idea from a 
larger body of related litigation. T.L.O. settled only a couple questions 
related to search. The most essential placed school officials in a category 
aside from other governmental officials and required only a standard of 
"reasonable suspicion" for search justification. 
The eight cases immediately following T.L.O. relied heavily on the 
Supreme Court's ruling. Yet T.L.O. was not a panacean decision. 
Important questions remained unanswered. The determination of 
reasonableness was left to inspection through an established inquiry 
process that offered little assistance in judging the weight of the variables. 
152Ibid. 
129 
Courts after T.L.O. were therefore faced with making many of the same 
judgments faced by pre-T.L.O. courts. 
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CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
SUMMARY 
Search and seizure involving public school children is a relatively 
recent issue in American public education, having its birth in the 1960's 
students' rights movement. Prior to this time, there undoubtedly were 
searches being conducted in the schools, but the issue remained a local one 
with only two exceptions finding their way into the courts. Although many 
searches were remarkably similar in facts surrounding the incident, they 
were often as dissimilar in their outcome. Search situations emerged 
nationally and involved lockers, automobiles, pocketbooks, personal 
belongings and clothes. They have involved drug-detecting dogs, mirrors, 
pat-downs, and outright strip searches. 
Based on the analysis of research presented in this study, it is 
apparent that the definition of "reasonableness" is elusive. Justices have 
looked at the exact same factors in a search situation and have divided over 
the issue of "reasonableness." Despite the Supreme Court's decision in 
New Jersey v. T.L.O.. which settled standards issue for school personnel to 
conduct searches, subsequent courts have continued to struggle with the 
same concept of reasonableness. 
The issue therefore remains important and timely. There is every 
indication that crime and misbehavior continue in the public schools which 
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will necessitate periodic inspection of students and their property. Parents 
will continue to question the legality of school searches. Attorneys, 
knowing that many issues related to school searches have gone 
unanswered, will represent students. 
Search and seizure in the American public schools is a constitutional 
issue. It involves a basic issue of student rights and freedom. It involves 
the application of the Fourth Amendment to children assigned to a public 
institution that maintains a limited custodial environment. It involves the 
rights and obligation of school personnel to maintain this environment to a 
level that is safe and conducive to learning. It involves school officials who 
have been difficult to define in their relationship to those whom they are 
charged to keep, to teach, and to protect. 
It is important to school personnel to be cognizant of issues 
concerning school search, in order to make sound educational and legal 
decisions. This study, which includes a comprehensive review of issues 
related to school search and seizure, will assist school officials in making 
those decisions. 
Summary 
The introductory material in Chapter 1 identified the 1985 landmark 
decision of New Jersey v. T.L.O. as the first Supreme Court decision related 
to search and seizure and the application of the Fourth Amendment to 
public school pupils. "Reasonable suspicion" was established as the 
standard by which school personnel would be held. Cases litigated in lower 
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courts prior to T.L.O.. were concentrated in the 1970's and early 1980's. 
Prior to the student rights' movement, only two search and seizure cases 
were recorded that involved public school students. Although searches 
undoubtedly occurred, they remained a local issue. It was not until the 
juxtaposition of a number of features including drugs, guns and student 
activism that cases began to reach the courts. 
Chapter 2 sought to put search and seizure into an historical 
perspective. The concept of a person's freedom from unreasonable search 
and seizure had its beginning in the British Common Law. The American 
experience, especially with writs of assistance, placed a high demand for 
this personal right and thus emerged the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution. Spanning the next two centuries criminal case law 
provided courts with sufficient search and seizure litigation to establish a 
series of legal precedents. Landmark cases identified in the literature were 
reviewed. 
An exhaustive review of literature specifically related to public school 
search and seizure was not attempted. Although numerous articles, 
chapters in books, and papers have been written on the subject, only a few 
have been scholarly in their approach. Reference to specific studies was 
used because of some particular contribution. The overwhelming majority 
of literature has come from the courts' own written decisions. 
Chapter 3 was specifically related to the "emerging standard of 
reasonableness." A significant number of cases prior to T.L.O. were 
inspected for specific contribution to facts and issues related to search. 
Insight can be gained by this process. Although the Supreme Court in 
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T.L.O. established that "reasonable suspicion" was the acceptable standard 
for school searches, other significant issues went unanswered. These 
included: (1) the status of the exclusionary rule; (2) the use of drag 
detecting dogs; (3) the use of one-way mirrors and electronic surveillance; 
(4) the involvement of police in conjunction with school personnel; and (5) 
the legality of strip searches. Reasonableness at best remains an elusive 
term. Establishing a framework predicated on common sense parameters 
is the only acceptable way to deal with "reasonableness." Cases subsequent 
to T.L.O. are devoid of discussion about in loco parentis and status of school 
personnel, but continue to struggle with specific facts of search, in 
determining its legality. 
No attempt has been made to review all school search and seizure 
cases in Chapter 4. The selection of pre-T.L.O. cases was made based on 
two factors. The first concerned specific criteria that was developed by the 
court to assist in defining reasonableness. For example, we see the two-
prong test of In re W.. and age, history, record, prevalence of problem and 
exigency factors from Scott D. The second factor involved representation 
that the case made to a specific issue. Therefore, cases were included that 
related to issues of in loco parentis, police involvement, the exclusionary 
rule, drug-detecting dogs, two-way mirrors, and strip search. 
The review of T.L.O. is important to this study because it allows for 
focus on the key issue of "reasonableness." The actual searches that 
occurred which precipitated litigation after T.L.O. took place prior to the 
Court's decision. The significance of this is those who were involved in 
conducting the searches, were not aided by any knowledge gained from the 
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landmark decision. Attorneys in the post-T.L.O. cases referred to T.L.O. in 
their arguments yet, no claim was made that the search was motivated or 
inspired by the decision. These post-T.L.O. cases continue to demonstrate 
similar frustrations and concerns over what constitutes "reasonableness." 
As a guide to the educational and legal research, six questions were 
formulated and listed in Chapter 1 of this study. The answer to these 
questions are incorporated in Chapters 3 and 4 and are summarized here 
in numerical order: 
1. How was the "standard of reasonableness" concept addressed in 
judicial decisions? 
This concept was considered in most litigation prior to T.L.O. Some 
courts chose to tie reasonableness to other concepts. The most popular was 
that of in loco parentis. Without a strong reliance on factors establishing 
reasonable suspicion or probable cause, the court chose to use this "in place 
of parent" doctrine to justify the search. Other courts chose a middle-
ground and viewed the school official as a "private citizen" uninhibited by 
the Fourth Amendment. And, of course, several courts viewed the school 
official as a governmental agent bound to the same requirements of police. 
In each situation stated above, there existed a set of intertwining 
circumstances which made each case unique. The courts were also 
involved in evaluating the scope of the search relative to the child's age, 
history and record in school, the prevalence of the problem which caused 
the search, and the exigency to conduct the search. These factors were 
135 
often balanced against the nature of the search and the courts' perception of 
the degree to which the school needed to maintain order and safety. 
By the time the Supreme Court granted certiorari to New Jersey v. 
T.L.O.. the lower courts were taking an ecletic approach to decision 
making. Although the majority of courts found "reasonable suspicion" as 
the standard for school officials, there remained great latitude in 
determining what was or was not "reasonable." 
2. How did the Supreme Court address the "standard of 
reasonableness" in T.L.O.? 
The Supreme Court summarily dismissed any notion that school 
officials would be held to the probable cause requirement imposed on law 
enforcement. Furthermore, the Court eliminated the application of in loco 
parentis as justification. The legality and justification of a search would 
depend upon "reasonable suspicion" considering all circumstances. A 
twofold inquiry was to be applied to the circumstances. First, was the 
search justified at its inception? In other words, could it be shown that 
there were sufficient grounds to believe that the search would turn up 
evidence to show a rule or law was broken. Second, was the search 
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which initially caused the 
search? In other words, was the procedure used to search reasonable 
related to the object of the search in light of the age and sex of the student 
and the seriousness of the infraction. 
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The Court did not delineate a set of circumstances to define 
reasonable searches nor did it seek to clarify "reasonableness" any further. 
From the inspection of circumstances surrounding the assistant 
principal's search of Terry Lee Owens, one can make an assessment of 
circumstances which justified "reasonable suspicion" in that particular 
case. Those circumstances might then be applied to a situation at hand. 
3. Did the Supreme Court's T.L.O. decision confirm previous judicial 
decisions by lower courts? 
The Supreme Court, in its own opinion succinctly stated that it was 
joining a "majority of courts" in rejecting the requirement for probable 
cause. The balance, the court reasoned, was one between privacy interests 
of school children and the substantial need of school officials to maintain 
order. The Court, nevertheless, deviated from the majority on the issue of 
in loco parentis. This concept, the Court reasoned, was in "tension with 
contemporary reality." As stated earlier, many lower court decisions 
involved search related issues that were neither confirmed nor rejected by 
the Court. 
4. Did T.L.O. redefine and establish new constitutional procedures? 
The Fourth Amendment specifically states that persons are to be 
secure from "unreasonable" searches and seizures unless a warrant has 
been issued. This warrant must be based on a sworn statement which 
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includes specific information as to what is being searched for and its 
location. The converse would simply be that persons would not be secure 
from "reasonable" searches. The Court in T.L.O. did establish new 
constitutional procedures in that a specific category of governmental 
officials is exempted from the standard required of virtually all other 
officials. Although this standard was applied regularly by lower courts, 
T.L.O. confirmed it. The specific procedure, as stated previously, was a 
twofold inquiry. 
5. How have lower courts addressed the "standard of 
reasonableness" concept since the Supreme Court's T.L.O. decision? 
All cases litigated since T.L.O. have made specific reference to the 
Supreme Court's decision. The lower courts, for the most part, have 
applied the twofold inquiry procedure and have carefully inspected the 
circumstances surrounding the search incident. But just as in pre-T.L.O. 
cases, the ultimate outcome is still subject to basic human judgment. 
Without a specific list of criteria for establishing a justifiable search, the 
court must substitute its own judgment based on facts of the case 
superimposed upon the framework established by T.L.O. 
6. Based on an analysis of judicial decisions since T.L.O.. what are 
the emerging trends and issues concerning search and seizure? 
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Eight post-T.L.O. cases were reviewed in this study. The most 
significant trend has been for the courts to apply the twofold inquiry 
established by the Supreme Court in T.L.O. The circumstances 
surrounding the searches are remarkably similar to those in most pre-
T.L.O. searches. With one exception, the courts have demanded the 
presence of substantial articulable facts for justification of the search at its 
inception. Even the exception was found to be justified based on suspicion 
and the preponderance of a drug problem at the school. 
Three other issues emerged that could signal future litigation. The 
first involves the presence and participation of police in a student's search. 
I >«!> 
This issue was not addressed in T.L.O. The second involves strip search. 
One case following T.L.O. involved an intrusive strip search which the 
court stated would have been reasonable if the original pocket search for 
drugs had been justified. This issue was not addressed in T.L.O. Third, 
the issue of admissibility of evidence continued to be part of student initiated 
litigation. The exclusionary rule, which was the original issue being 
reviewed by T.L.O.. was not part of the Court's final decision because the 
search was found to be justified. 
Conclusions 
Analyzing and drawing conclusions from legal research is a difficult 
task. Although legal issues appear to be similar from one case to another, 
the circumstances of each individual case can cause a different decision. 
Nevertheless, certain conclusions can be drawn from the research 
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concerning the emerging standard of reasonableness for search and 
seizure in the American public schools. 
1. Searches in the public school will continue to be performed and 
will continue to be litigated. 
2. In loco parentis will no longer serve as a sanctuary for school 
officials seeking to justify the search of a public school student or his 
property. 
3. Immunity from civil prosecution will be difficult to obtain for 
school officials conducting unjustified and illegal searches. 
4. The courts will continue to be concerned about student rights and 
will not permit unrestrained search by school officials. A balance between 
the student's rights and the school's need to maintain order and an 
atmosphere conducive to learning will continue to be made. 
5. "Reasonable suspicion" supported by articulable facts will be the 
standard applied to school personnel. 
6. Defining "reasonable suspicion" will continue to be a problem 
involving the judicial conceptualization of factors surrounding school 
related searches. 
7. Reasonableness will be based on factors surrounded by a legal 
framework involving articulable facts and a reasonable scope of search 
based on those facts. This "twofold inquiry" will remain dependent on 
human interpretation. 
8. Other issues related to reasonable suspicion and search and 
seizure will continue to emerge in future litigation. 
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9. The courts have continued to show a strong support for school 
officials, especially when a relationship can be shown between the area 
searched and the object being searched for. 
Recommendations 
The stated purpose of this study was to provide school officials, who 
are involved in the day-by-day operation of the schools, information that 
would assist them in making decisions about search and seizure. 
Although the Supreme Court's T.L.O. decision did not produce a panacea, 
it did eliminate the need to establish "probable cause" and it did produce a 
general framework upon which a search might be evaluated. 
Although the trend is to apply this framework, it must be understood 
that the right to search students is not unlimited. Reasonable suspicion 
was the standard that emerged from most pre-T.L.O. cases and reasonable 
suspicion has specific criteria. Students and their parents will continue to 
challenge the school's right to search. School officials must operate from a 
basis stronger than a "hunch." Articulable facts that can be tied together 
by an ordinarily cautious and prudent man to show that a search is 
justified will continue to be the basis of the standard. 
The board of education and the central office administration of each 
school system should develop a search and seizure policy and require that 
all personnel be knowledgeable of its requirements. This can be 
accomplished by a comprehensive staff development involving all 
employees. The twofold test in T.L.O.. the two-pronged test in In re W. and 
the child's age, history, record in school, prevalence of the problem and the 
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exigency considerations from Scott D. should be incorporated into the 
policy. 
Those charged with frontline involvement with students are the most 
likely to become involved in a search. Almost all litigation researched in 
this study indicates that the application of good judgment and common 
sense will lead to a reasonable and justifiable search. It has been the 
excesses that glare out as exceptions. Strip searching fifth graders on mere 
suspicion, for example. 
A battery of simple questions, asked prior to a search, can reduce the 
risk of performing an illegal search. These questions, accompanied by a 
brief rationale, are as follows: 
1. Are the facts supportive of a reasonable expectation that the 
student is secreting contraband? If only a "hunch" exists or if the factors 
surrounding the suspicion can be attributed to other causes, reevaluate the 
search and be cautious of the justification. Courts have not been 
sympathetic to overzealous administrators even when the search was 
productive. 
2. What are the supporting factors, evidence and circumstances that 
make the central stimuli for search more plausible? Unless the central 
cause is conclusive and overpowering, it is recommended that other 
supporting factors be present in order to be assured of a reasonable search. 
3. Is the rule or regulation significant enough to justify a search in 
the first place? Common sense must prevail. If the rule is no gum in class, 
and the student is observed making chewing motions, is it worth the risk to 
require pockets to be emptied? 
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4. Is the search procedure employed equitable to the item being 
searched for? Research has shown that reasonable suspicion is sufficient 
to justify a search based upon articulable facts, but as the intrusiveness of 
the search increases, the standard for justification approaches probable 
cause. Strip search, for example, should not be employed until all 
questions are answered in the positive and the outcome can be balanced 
with the search. The majority of strip search cases have been found to be 
unjustified and unreasonable. 
5. Are the circumstances so compelling that a search must be 
conducted without delay and without accumulating articulable facts? 
Research has shown that the exigency of a situation can be a central factor 
in justifying a search. When danger is imminent or when the welfare of 
the student or student body is threatened, a search should proceed without 
delay. 
Unfortunately the need to search students is not likely to diminish in 
the near future. With the high pressure job of administering a public 
school, goes the responsibility to make the school's environment safe for 
students and conducive to learning. The execution of a justifiable search is 
one aspect of accomplished leadership. Today's school administrator 
cannot shirk this responsibility and is therefore compelled to be 
knowledgeable, as well as competent, about school searches. The 
emergence and maintenance of "reasonable suspicion" from past, present 
and future litigation, makes this task easier, but not easy. 
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Recommendations for Further Study 
Because so many courts were involved in litigation relative to search 
and seizure, it would be interesting and informative to develop a computer 
program to assist in analyzing the cases. The complexity of issues, the 
various judicial levels and the large number of cases, prevents a 
comprehensive non-assisted analysis. Some studies have made 
comparisons of one or two issues, but even here the list was not exhaustive. 
An input sheet that could be fed directly into the computer via an optic 
scanner would hasten the process and allow for standardized updates. If 
input factors included specific facts related to the search, data involving the 
court hearing the case, plus other logistical information, the data could be 
cross-referenced, categorized, and equated. 
A possible use of this could be to allow practicing administrators 
faced with a search to check the outcome of previous litigation based on 
similar circumstances. It could possibly produce probability coefficients 
that could be assigned to particular court districts or circuits. 
A study of police involvement and the introduction of evidence in 
criminal proceedings could also be expanded from this study. Because the 
Supreme Court did not categorically address each issue litigated over the 
years, numerous questions are being left for the lower courts to decide. A 
study predicting the Supreme Court's position on these issues would be 
enlightening. 
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